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By 0. OTTO MOORE
0. Otto Moore is Chief Justice of the "'
Colorado Supreme Court. He received
his legal training at the University of ,7,
Denver College of Law where he was
granted an LL.B. degree in 1922. That
year he was admitted to practice law
in Colorado, and he engaged in active
practice until 1949 when he became an
Associate Justice of the Colorado Su-
preme Court. He has served on the
court continuously since 1949. Chief
Justice Moore is a member of the Colo-
rado, Denver and American Bar Asso-
ciations. He is chairman of the Colo-
rado Judicial Conference.
In this article I wish to make suggestions to those who are contem-
plating appearances in the Supreme Court. These suggestions, if fol-
lowed, will go a long way toward cutting down the backlog of cases;
enable the court to write better opinions; permit us to apply our time
to a consideration of the merits of the controversies before us; and
result in speedier determination of those cases and fewer dismissals on
technical grounds.
I direct your attention to the provisions of Rule 112 (e) .1 This
rule is all but forgotten by the members of the bar. In the approxi-
mately 2000 plus cases which have been disposed of by the Colorado
Supreme Court in the past eight years I cannot recall more than four
or five that have been submitted under its provisions. In pertinent part
this rule provides:
"When the questions presented by a writ of error can be
determined without an examination of all the pleadings, evi-
dence, and proceedings in the court below, the parties may
prepare and sign a statement of the case showing how the ques-
tions arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth
only so many of the facts averred and proved or sought to be
proved as are essential to a decision of the questions by the
supreme court. The statement shall include a copy of the judg-
ment sought to be reviewed and a concise statement of the
grounds to be relied on by the plaintiff in error. If the state-
ment conforms to the truth, it, together with such additions as
the court may consider necessary fully to present the questions
raised by the writ of error, shall be approved by the trial court
and shall then be certified to the supreme court as the record
on error."
1 Colo. R. Civ. P. 112(e).
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We will never know how many thousands of dollars have been
expended by litigants to defray the cost of preparing thousands of pages
of reporters' transcripts, many pages of which had no relevancy what-
ever to any point urged on writ of error. Many thousands of hours
have been spent by members of the supreme court in reading the count-
less questions and answers contained in the transcripts of court reporters.
Those hours could have been saved if counsel for the parties had con-
scientiously made use of the "agreed statements." It is my sincere belief
that at least one-third of the cases which have been decided in recent
years could well have been presented by counsel upon an agreed state-
ment within the provisions of Rule 112, without jeopardizing in the
least the rights of any of the litigants, or without reducing the chances
of a successful result for either party. On the contrary, agreed statements
of the issues, without exception, will make for clarity of the questions
which you ask the court to decide. If the questions are clear there is
a remote chance that the answer which the court gives may be equally
clear. At least there would be less ground, after adverse decision, for
the losing party to claim that the court had bypassed the most important
point in his case.
The next time you have a matter to present in the supreme court
consider seriously whether the "agreed statement" technique would ade-
q uately present the controlling issues to the court. It will save your
ients a lot of money for expensive records. It will save the court a
lot of valuable time which otherwise would be used in reading many
pages of matter irrelevant to the issues on the appellate court level.
Let me now direct your attention to Rule 113. I quote therefrom:
"Whenever plaintiff in error desires a stay of execution
pending the determination of a writ of error, he may apply to
the supreme court for a supersedeas at any time after the filing
therein of the record prepared and certified in accordance with
rule 112. A succinct brief shall be filed with such application
for supersedeas and served upon the defendant in error. * * *
At the time of filing his first brief either party may request
a final determination of the controversy."
2
When a matter is at issue on application for supersedeas the clerk
of the court immediately brings the record and briefs to the Chief Jus-
tice who assigns it at once to a judge to look over and report whether
supersedeas should be granted. He makes his recommendation, the
court then acts. Many times we find that application for supersedeas
is made in cases where nothing would be accomplished by granting it.
In claims for money judgment, where the trial court or jury has found
against the plaintiff and judgment has been entered for the defendant,
don't bother about an application for supersedeas. Ordinarily the court
will not grant supersedeas in such a case, and it would be manifestly
unfair to decide the merits of the case on the briefs filed in support of
the supersedeas application. If the court did this the effect would be
to move the case from the bottom of the docket to the top, and other
cases at issue on the merits would be delayed immeasurably by that
device. Any case which the court elects to decide finally on the super-
sedeas briefs will be moved to the bottom of the docket and will be
determined in the regular order. Unless there is some specific purpose
to be served, do not conclude that in every case you must secure a super-
2 Colo. R. Clv. P. 1,13.
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sedeas if you are to properly represent the interests of your clients. Pe-
titions for supersedeas and briefs in support consume a lot of the court's
time. All too frequently the time is wasted for the reason that the liti-
gant seeking the supersedeas has nothing whatever to gain in making
the application.
I do not mean to say that you should hesitate to apply for super-
sedeas in those cases in which your client will suffer prejudice unless
the judgment be stayed. A full reading of Rule 113 should be indulged
by counsel just prior to making an application for supersedeas. The rule
itself will suggest the type of case in which supersedeas will be frowned
upon by the appellate court. Don't file the application just to harrass
your opponent, because by so doing you harrass the court as well, and
time is lost which could be applied elsewhere.
Hundreds of man hours are spent by judges of the court in con-
sidering petitions filed for the purpose of invoking the original juris-
diction of the court. The constitution provides that the supreme court
"shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, pro war-
ranto, certiorari, injunction, and other original and remedial writs,
with authority to hear and determine the same." All too frequently
counsel have attempted to use the petition for rule to show cause as a
substitute for a writ of error. Scarcely a week goes by but a judge of
the court is required to give several hours study to a petition for a writ
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I(Eystone 4-2111
e4euf &A - DExter 3.8555 aide GEnesee 3.6611
.A6..... ....
This Alligator "Platinum Label"
coat is the coat to live in come rain,
sleet, cold or sunshine. Fine wool
gabardine .. smooth and silky...
water repellent .. just the
-!i~ig~to right weight. In a smart shade of tan.
ownton n49.75
..,. .... . Downtown and Cherry Creek, main floor - Lakeside, mail level
DICTA
DICTA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1957
of prohibition or other relief formerly known as the common law pre-
rogative writs, when few, if any, of the requisites for such relief are
present. In many instances where rule to show cause issues, the respond-
ent makes a showing which completely destroys the position of the ap-
plicant and the rule is discharged after the court has wasted a lot of time.
Very often nothing whatever is accomplished by this loss of time. The
parties are left exactly where they were to begin with, and the work, or
a substantial portion thereof, must be done over again, when the case
arrives in regular course on writ of error.
Be sure of your ground in asking the court to assume original juris-
diction. Put all the pertinent facts in your petition-not just those which
seem to favor your own contention. Put all the cards on the table. Don't
stack the deck in your petition. Your time, and that of the court, is
worth something. Don't waste it!
During the summer I attended a seminar for appellate court judges
conducted by New York University. From 9:00 A.M. until 12:30 P.M.
and from 2:00 until 4:00 P.M. for ten full days twenty-two judges of
appellate courts in the nation were exposed to the intellects of experts
in various fields of judicial activity. It was a very worthwhile experi-
ence. Several sessions of the seminar were devoted to the subject, "The
Technique of Writing Opinions." I believe that the basic rules which
should govern the author of an opinion are substantially the same as
those which should control the form and substance of a brief. I learned
in New York this summer just how bad some opinions which I have
written really are when tested on the scales used by experts to evaluate
the output of appellate courts.
Let me quote briefly from a lecture delivered by Circuit Judge
Frederick G. Hamley, former chief justice of the Washington Supreme
Court, and recognized authority on opinion writing:
"But while we treasure variety, let us also recognize that
there are certain minimum requirements which all opinions
should meet, and certain characteristics of form or organization
which are to be striven for, or avoided, as the case may be.
"The ordinary appellate court opinion contains state-
ments covering the following five points: (1) The nature of
the action and how it got to the appellate court; (2) the ques-
tions to be decided; (3) the essential facts; (4) a determination
of the questions; and (5) the disposition of the case."
If you will examine carefully the contents of Rule 115 '1 you will
discover that the requirements of the brief as there set forth are such as
to point up the responsibility of the appellate court, and to reduce the
labor of the court to a minimum in discharging the five-fold function of
the judicial opinion. Let me again quote from Judge Hamley:
"Extreme care must always be taken to assure a fair and
impartial statement. This is particularly true with respect to
the facts favorable to the side which is going to lose on the
appeal. Chandler points out, in this connection, that judges
need to be especially careful that they do not unconsciously
color the statement of facts to support the conclusions which
are to follow. That is a fault about which trial lawyers fre-
3 Colo. R. Civ. P. 115.
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quently complain in petitions for rehearing. A lawyer will
forgive a judge for mistaking the law. But take his facts away
from him and he is bitter!"
If this is true of the opinion-it is equally true of the brief.
It is possible to write a brief that is "easy to read." It is possible
to write a brief which will carry the sustained interest of the reader
without conscious struggling to "follow the ball." There are some simple
rules which if applied will bring this result. Judge Hamfey stated in
his address to the seminar judges that "ease" of reading depends pri-
marily upon the structure of the words, sentences and paragraphs which
go to make up the opinion-or the brief. Long words, he said, are
notoriously hard to read. "Fancy words are often merely evidence of
pompous pride of knowledge." He directed attention to Winston
Churchill's statement: "Short words are best and the old words when
short are best of all." There are fourteen words in that sentence and
no word is more than one syllable in length. We all agree with the
statement, but we judges don't always bear it in mind when writing
opinions, and I for one can testify that many lawyers pay no attention
to it when writing their briefs.
Many times I have studied a brief with a dictionary at my elbow
which I frequently consult to determine the meaning of words of many
syllables, only to find that a very commonplace word of one or two
syllables would have served the purpose better. I am then not too happy
at being reminded of my limited knowledge in dealing with sesquipe-
dalian words. (Sesquipedalian means one and a half feet long. I re-
member it because it was one of the words I found in a brief upon which
I wasted time looking for the meaning of the word in the dictionary.)
Professor E. H. Warren of Harvard Law School gives seven tangible
rules to improve juristic style. One of them is:
"See to it that not less than 66% of your words are words of one
syllable, and that not less than 83% are words of one or two syllables."
When you read over the first draft of your brief, put a check mark
over the long words. With a little effort you can find a substitute which
is short and even more effective. So much then for words. What about
sentences?
Dr. Rudolph Flesch in his recent book "The Art of Readable
Writing," says that the average number of words in the standard Eng-
lish sentence is seventeen. Very difficult writing contains twenty-nine
words or more per sentence. He asserts that the legal profession stands
HEART OF DOWNTOWN: 1409 Stout -- TA 5-3404
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"accused of being the one profession that thinks it can't live without
long sentences." No one knows better than the judges of the supreme
court that long drawn-out sentences become so complex that they are
not readily understandable. Yet lawyers persist in loading their briefs
with long sentences. It makes for heavy reading. It is done in an effort
to be exact, and cover all angles connected with every statement.
The late Judge Cardoza said, "The sentence may be so overloaded
with all its possible qualifications that it will tumble down of its own
weight."
Another distinguished authority has said that the cure for "sentence
inflation" is to stop being stuffy, legalistic, technical and overly precise.
Most long sentences consist of a series of phrases joined together
with conjunctives or disjunctives. How easy it is, when the first draft
has been completed, to strike out some of those "ands" and "ors," and
cut the long sentences in twol To one who is not used to doing this,
it will at first seem as if the smooth flow of the first draft has been de-
stroyed. But a little practice will demonstrate that smoothness need
not be sacrificed in cutting the length of sentences. On the other hand,
ease of reading and force will be gained. So much then for the sen-
tences you write in your briefs.
What about the paragraphs? All that has been said about the
sentence applies with equal force to the paragraph. The "ease" of
reading a brief can be greatly improved by the use of short paragraphs.
Hamley told us in New York that, "Almost every paragraph which con-
tains more than three or four sentences is too long."
All of us would rather read a printed page consisting of three or
four paragraphs than one continuous paragraph from top to bottom.
It is a hard job to wade through five or six pages of printed matter with-
out a break for a paragraph. Yet how frequently we find it in briefs.
It doesn't help the "ease" of reading the brief. Short words-short sen-
tences-short paragraphs-make for "ease" of reading.
"Readability" means "ease" of reading plus interest. How can you
make your briefs more interesting to read? First let me suggest that you
may crash through the skull barrier of members of the court and guide
them toward the conclusion for which you contend by putting concrete
examples after your statements of abstract principles. Don't forget that
the greatest of all teachers used parables. It helps to create interest.
Word pictures, concreteness, clarity, can be gained by the frequent use
of the names of the litigants, rather than a constant repetition of the
cumbersome "plaintiff in error," "defendant in error," "third party de-
fendant," or similar terms. Interest is stimulated when you say, "Joseph
Henry brought an action against Clara Bell. He alleged that Clara con-
tracted, and so forth." It is more interesting than to say, "plaintiff in
error brought an action against defendant in error."
Interest can be stimulated by reference to real names and real loca-
tions rather than by the uninteresting "A. B. 8c C.," or the overworked
"Blackacre" or "Whitacre." It is more interesting to read about what
happened to the southwest forty acres of the farm which Clara Bell
claimed she owned. In negligence cases, instead of saying, "conditions
were suitable for driving on the night in question," why not say, "the
pavement was dry, the night was clear, the moon was full"?
It is of prime importance to remember that judges know nothing
about the case except that which is contained in the briefs. We consult
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the briefs first, expecting thereby to get a clear picture of the controversy.
Unlike the author of the briefs, we have not lived with the case for a
year or two theretofore. What may seem perfectly clear to the author
of the brief who has been close to the controversy throughout its develop-
ment may not be equally clear to the judge who must get all his infor-
mation from the brief. One of the things to be kept constantly in mind
is the importance of clear expression. Will someone who picks up
your brief and who knows nothing of the case, get a distinct and accur-
ate picture of just what you are writing about? If not, there is a lack
of clarity in your style. It might be well to ask a lawyer friend, who
has never heard of your case, to read your brief and criticize it. If it is
clear to him it is barely possible that even we will understand it.
Daniel Webster observed that, "The power of clear statement is
the great power at the bar." Make your assertions clear; let no judge
read your brief and have doubts about what you consider to be the con-
trolling questions in the case at hand. Let no judge be in doubt as to
what you think the answers to those questions should be.
"A clear style is one that is sincere, simple, coherent and direct. It
results from exactness in the use of specific words-short words-short
sentences-short paragraphs."
In your statement of the case the court wants the facts. Be honest
and candid in stating them as they are. The court does not want argu-
ments, nor explanations, nor interpretations. Do not avoid important
facts in the record because they are against you. State them before your
opponent does. This at least demonstrates fairness on your part, and
the adverse matter will hurt you less if you face up to it voluntarily.
Develop a reputation in all courts for accuracy of statement and
your future assertions will be respected. Segregate the undisputed facts
from those which are disputed. This will help the court to grasp and
understand the case. Avoid long quotations from the record. It inter-
feres with easy readability. If you set your hand to it you can develop
the art of clear summarization, and your folio references will guide us
to the full text if issue is taken with your summary.
I must not omit mention of the area in which the lawyer can be
of greatest assistance to the court. Before you start work on your brief,
read and reread Rule 115.4 Read all the sub-sections of that rule. Don't
start your brief until you understand it. On numerous occasions our
court has warned of the possible consequence of noncompliance there-
with.
In Mauldin v. Lowey, 5 the opinion of Chief Justice Stone con-
tained the following:
"The brief of plaintiffs in error, upon which reversal of
the judgment of the trial court is sought, contains no subject
index and no summary of the argument, separately or other-
wise, and no other provision for advising this Court of the
grounds relied on for reversal. There is no separate statement
of the case, as required by Rule 115 (a) and (c), and the part
of the brief which might be considered as intended for such
statement is intermingled with argument; the statement of
facts is not supported by references to folio numbers of the
4 Colo. I. Civ. P. 115.
5 127 Colo. 234, 255 P.2d 976 (1953).
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record, and the verdict and judgment sought to be reviewed
are not set forth.
"Our Court will not search through briefs to discover what
errors are relied on, and then search through the record for
supporting evidence. It is the task of counsel to inform us, as
required by our rules, both as to the specific errors relied on
and the grounds and supporting facts and authorities therefor.
"The judgment is affirmed."'6
In Fraka v. Malernee,7 the court said:
"Because the writ of error in the instant cause must be
dismissed, and for the reason that there seems to be a growing
tendency among members of the bar to believe that briefs can
be filed whenever it is convenient, and that the Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to proceedings before this Court can be
ignored or violated without serious consequences, we feel com-
pelled to say that failure to follow the established rules of ap-
pellate practice may be fatal to a cause. Our Court intends to
enforce the Rules of Civil Procedure, and we solicit the coop-
eration of members of the bar, with the firm belief that they
will approve an orderly procedure in appellate practice which
can only be brought about by the observance of the rules which
must govern that practice. We return to a consideration of the
case at hand.
' 8
In Waters v. Culver,9 we said:
"Failure of plaintiff in error to comply with Rule 115 of
our Rules of Civil Procedure ordinarily would be fatal to our
consideration of this cause. The brief of plaintiff in error does
not contain a concise statement of the facts 'based on the evi-
dence material to the case' with appropriate folio references."1
In Gardner v. City of Englewood," the opinion written by the late
Justice Clark pointed out in detail the essentials of a brief. Several
other cases could be mentioned in which the court has directed attention
to the necessity for compliance with Rule 115.
It might interest you to know that thus far in the year 1957 there
have been about 115 motions filed by lawyers attacking the work of
other lawyers as being short of compliance with Rule 115. These mo-
tions are to strike briefs which have been filed, and for dismissal of
writs of error. Each of these motions is supported by a brief and the
lawyer whose work is thus attacked filed a brief attempting to excuse
the failure to abide by Rule 115, and, having read it apparently for the
first time, frantically seeks to avoid the impending disaster. I think I'm
safe in saying there isn't a judge on the court who has not been com-
pelled within the past ten days to give at least two or three hours of his
time to a study of a motion to dismiss a writ of error grounded on the
assertion that Rule 115 has been ignored by his opponent.
6 Id. at 236, 255 P.2d at 977.
7 129 Colo. 87, 267 P.2d 651 (1954).
8 Id. at 90, 267 P.2d at 653.
9 130 Colo. 360, 275 P.2d 936 (1954).
10 Id. at 361, 275 P.2d at 937.
11 131 Colo. 210, 282 P.2d 1084 (1955).
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Not all of such motions are well founded to be sure, but whether
well founded or not, a vast amount of time is given over to a study of
the question of compliance with this rule. If the brief is prepared in
conformity with the rule all of this wasted time could be saved, and we
would not be one full year behind submission date in handing down an
opinion.
If you can't understand Rule 115, and don't know how to go about
setting up your brief, let me suggest that you ask the capable Clerk,
Mr. George Trout, to give you the number of a case in which a good
brief was written. Look up that brief and use it for a guide.1  Better
still, invest a five dollar bill in one of the several very fine books which
are available on the subject.
1 3
The quality of the opinions which judges write is very largely a
reflection of the ability of the lawyers. If I am ever accused of having
written a particularly good opinion I am ready to admit in advance that
the credit should go to the very fine briefs which have been filed by
counsel on both sides of the case. A good brief on one side and a poor
brief on the other will not necessarily lead to a good opinion. I assure
you that it is a great pleasure to study the briefs of able lawyers whose
work meets the standards set by the rules.
It is a great burden to have a case assigned for an opinion in which
the briefs reflect the fact that counsel have failed to conform to the
orderly procedures outlined in the rules, and the opinion which is
rendered in such a case may be good or bad. If I wrote it, and if it is
bad, I shall insist that the lawyers who wrote the briefs which did half
a job should share at least half the responsibility for the poor opinion.
It is the fervent wish of the court that bench and bar may cooperate
in a joint effort to save the time of the busy lawyer and the time of a
hard-pressed court; that the busy court shall understand the problem
of the busy lawyer and not be unduly critical of his minor shortcomings;
that the busy lawyer will be mindful of the heavy demands upon the
time and energies of the busy courts; that together we may cause it to
be said that in this jurisdiction justice is being served as effectively and
efficiently as is possible through human means.
1 2
E.g., see the excellent briefs in Colo. Sup. Ct. Case #18171.
13 E.g., Pittoni, Suggestions on Brief Writing and Argumentation (Foundation
Press 195--).
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MECHANICS' LIENS RELATIVE TO
OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS - - PART II
By PHILIP G. DUFFORD AND RICHARD R. HELMICK
EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the second in-
stallment of an article which began in the
July-August issue, 34 DICTA 207 (1957)
In the first section of this article, we concluded that a lien claimant
wishing to claim a lien against an oil and gas interest must comply with
the provisions of the specific statute.31 We are now faced with the prob-
lem of interpreting the specific statute. Interpreting this statute brings
us to a discussion of the property and property interests which are sub-
ject to the lien, the parties who may assert it, the details of claiming and
enforcing the lien, and the extent of deficiency liability.
PROPERTY AND PROPERTY INTERESTS SUBJECT TO THE LIEN
It must be said at the outset that it is possible to become so em-
broiled within the language of the statute and the variations of judicial
interpretations relating to such language, that the underlying theory
and purpose of the mechanics' lien can be lost entirely. We believe that
much of the confusion in this field is due to a failure on the part of the
courts to relate the particular statute under interpretation to its purpose.
A sensible interpretation of the statute, in our opinion, requires constant
relation of the statutory language to the basic concepts of a mechanics'
lien. A completely different result can be obtained with ample justifi-
cation from a purely literal interpretation.
We have concluded that the specific statute should be construed to
grant a lien right only against a real property interest. We think that
a careful analysis of the statute and of the holdings of the Poudre River
32
and Terminal 33 cases indicate that this is the intent of the statute. In
taking this position, we are aware that others have concluded differently.
3 4
Nonetheless, even the confirmed advocates of this theory must admit
31 Recall that it was not clear in the general statute whether oil and gas interests
were subject to the lien granted by the general statute; and the specific statute was
enacted, in our opinion, for the purpose of providing a clear basis for the lien against
such interests. Terminal Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549, 550,
557 (1928), views all of the lien statutes-general, the mining section of the general.
and the specific-together and decrees that they are to be applied in pari materia;
and to this is added the mandate from Chain 0' Mines v. Lewison, 100 Colo. 186, 66
P.2d 802 (1935), that the specific statute is intended to broaden the scope of the
mechanic's lien. Our conclusion in the presence of these factors was that in the areas
where the specific statute legislated it was the exclusive remedy, with the qualifica-
tion that it supplemented and did not abridge the remedies provided by the general
lien act.
32 Poudre River Oil Corp. v. Carey, 83 Colo. 419, 266 Pac. 201 (1928).
33 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549 (1928).
34 Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 31, 45 (1948). This author consistently takes
the position that personal property is subject to the liens given by the specific stat-
ute, but only in favor of the supplier of the personalty. Particularly illustrative of such
author's position is this statement:
"While this statute gives a lien on personal property (materials, machin-
ery and supplies), this lien is restricted for the benefit of those who furnish
the same. This personal property is not subject to a lien for labor unless and
until it becomes a part of the realty, i.e., a fixture: in which event the inter-
est of a mere contractor in the derrick and drilling rig becomes subject to
the lien of a laborer under a subcontractor under such contractor, in the
absence of notice of nonliability, as well as the interest of a subcontractor of
the lessee in a boiler and engine, even where the boiler and engine has been
leased to the subcontractor by a third party to whom it actually belonged."
Id. at 45.
Recent writers, however, in viewing the statute, have presumed the conclusion we
advance. See Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 95 (1955).
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that the specific statute is not clear on this point and is, therefore,
subject to varying views. The one we advance we naturally feel is that
which yields the most meaningful and orderly results, and is the one
which we feel to be most strongly suggested by our available authority.
It has been stated that the mechanics' lien is a creature of statute
in derogation of the common law.35 This statutory right arises from the
social policy favoring certain creditors, 6 which policy we believe to be
due to the following factors. Where credit is voluntarily extended, secu-
rity can be contracted for by the creditor before he permits the com-
modity to leave his possession, and there is no justification for giving
him any greater right than generally available to creditors under our
economic system. As a practical 'matter, security cannot be readily
obtained for materials or labor furnished upon credit for the improve-
ment or benefit of land, and the fact that the value furnished cannot
be readily reclaimed makes such credit one of the least secure of unse-
cured credit, and ordinarily for a relatively long period of time. Also,
the parties furnishing such benefits, at least as to labor, have tradi-
tionally been those members of our economic society who depend for
their living upon receiving an hour's pay for an hour's work." Accord-
ingly, those who enhance the value of the land by furnishing labor or
materials for the improvement thereof are given a lien against such
land to secure payment of their claims. 38 It is a means of eliminating
the search for assets and earmarking specific property for the payment
of the debt before the creditor parts with the benefit which he can
bestow.39
Although we have concluded that the lien is against real property
only, we hasten to point out that a real property interest often includes
many valuable improvements which are frequently thought of as per-
sonalty. In an effort to avoid confusion in this regard, we introduce into
our discussion the phrases "affixed or installed personalty" and "de-
tached personal property," to distinguish between those items of per-
sonal property which have become absorbed into the well and its appur-
tenances, and those items of personal property which are merely used in
the drilling and operation of the well, but retain their individual identity
and portability. In determining the character of particular personal
property as affixed personalty or detached personal property, we find it
helpful to draw a parallel to the liens available against ordinary build-
ing construction under the general statute. For example, we conclude
that casing in the hole is a part of the improvement and therefore affixed
personalty even though it could be removed.
As a similar instance in general construction, an installed heating
plant could be removed relatively easily by its supplier, but it becomes
a part of the lienable structure when installed-lienable by all of the
lien claimants. 40 Conversely, we conclude that a portable rig is ordi-
narily not lienable, just as hoist equipment installed on the location of a
skyscraper being constructed is temporary and not lienable, regardless
of how securely it may be affixed to the structure during construction.
35 See the first section of our article, 34 DICTA at 214. citing Lane, Mechanics'
Liens in Colorado. 3 (1948).
36 Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 21 (1955).
17 Id. at 21.
38 IV American Law of Property § 16.106F (1952).
39 See Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 10-11 (1955); (and see generally
1 3 of this work).
40 In re Ben Boldt, Jr.. Floral Co., 37 F.2d 499 (10th Cir. 1930).
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In each instance, it is, of course, a factual determination, but not too
difficult since the intent in placing the personalty upon the property
should usually be quite clear.4
Upon this construction, property which does not become an insepa-
rable part of the leasehold estate,4 2 that is, detached personal property,
is not lienable. A condition of the statute is that the labor or material
furnished was so furnished "by virtue of a contract . . . with the owner
or lessee of any interest in real estate .... -41 Where such condition is
41 Lane, supra, note 23 at 36-39.
42 This discussion is concerned principally with the leasehold estate, since that
is the interest commonly available to the lien claimant; but the remarks are equally
applicable to any real property interest detailed in the statute.
43 Because of the need for constant reference to the first section of the specific
statute throughout a consideration of the questions discussed in this article, the first
section is quoted here in full. "Property subject to lien. Every person, firm or cor-
poration, whether as contractor, subcontractor, material man, or laborer, who per-
forms labor upon or furnishes machinery, material, fuel, explosives, power or supplies
for sinking, repairing, altering or operating any gas well, oil well or other well, or
for constructing, repairing, or operating any oil derrick, oil tank, oil pipe line or
water pipe line, pump or pumping station, transportation or communication line, gas-
oline plant and refinery, by virtue of a contract, express or implied, with the owner
or lessee of any interest in real estate, or with the trustee, agent or receiver of any
such owner, part owner or lessee, shall have a lien to secure the payment thereof upon
the properties mentioned, belonging to the party or parties contracting with the lien
claimants, and upon the machinery, materials and supplies so furnished, and upon
any well upon and in which such machinery, materials and supplies shall have been
placed and used, and upon all other wells, buildings and appurtenances, and the
interest, leasehold or otherwise, of such owner, part owner or lessee in the lot or
land upon which said improvements are located, or to which they may be removed,
to the extent of the right, title and interest of the owner, part owner or lessee, at the
time the work was commenced or machinery, materials and supplies were begun to be
furnished by the lien claimant or by the contractor under the original contract; and
such lien shall extend to any subsequently acquired interest of any such owner, part
owner or lessee." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-1 (1953).
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fulfilled, the statute gives the laborer or materialman a "lien to secure
the payment thereof upon the properties mentioned belonging to the
party or parties contracting with the lien claimants ...... Considering
for the moment only these two provisions, if the lien is given against the
properties of the contracting party, and the contracting party must be
the owner or lessee of a real property interest, the inference is that the
lien is given against real property. This inference is fortified by the fact
that the statute uses the phrase "properties mentioned" and although
open to some argument itself, the "properties mentioned" are "any gas
well, oil well, or other well, or ... any oil derrick, oil tank, oil pipeline
or water pipeline, pump or pumping station, transportation or com-
munication line, gasoline plant and refinery," all of which "properties,"
we submit, are affixed or installed personalty and therefore real prop-
erty.
44
If some of the "properties mentioned" are not considered real prop-
erty per se, we believe that they are intended to be restricted to their
character as real property for purposes of the statute because the only
properties which could be in question follow the words "constructing,
repairing, or operating," the import of which to us is a permanency
characteristic of real property improvements. Present day operations do
not even permit the extension of the lien to detached personal property
belonging to the contracting party upon the theory expressed in the
dissenting opinion of the Terminal case. 45 Under present operating pro-
cedure it could not be inferred that the portable drilling rig, no matter
who owns it, is intended to become a part of the well.
46
We believe that the view that the "properties mentioned" are real
property is further supported by the fact that at the time the statute
was written, oil derricks were more permanent installations than they
are now. 47 "Rig" and "derrick" are sometimes used interchangeably,48
the current usage favoring "rig," presumably because of the highly por-
44 This interpretation blocks the possible argument that the statutory language
Is broad enough to grant a lien also against any personal property which might belong
to the same contracting party.
45 84 Colo. 279, 289, 269 Pac. 894, 899 (1928).
46 We do not consider this a departure from the basic statutory interpretation,
however, since in such instances the property in question is not really detached per-
sonal property but has become a part of the real estate interest of the contracting
party.
47 See Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, supra, note 33, at p. 281. 84 Colo. 279, 281, 269
PaC. 894 (1928).
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table character of present day units. The word "rig" was used in both
the Poudre River and Terminal cases, but without particular meaning
and with confusion in result. The Poudre decision impliedly considered
the rig detached personal property. The majority opinion in the Termi-
nal case (written by the same Justice who wrote the Poudre opinion)
considered the rig a part of the real estate.49 The dissenting opinion in
the Terminal case considered the "derrick" as an item of portable equip-
ment.
The clauses which follow the basic grant of lien in the statute, com-
mencing with the first "and upon," do not in our opinion expand the
right given to embrace detached personal property, but merely describe
the various real property interests involved, some of which would not
by a strict construction of the statute fall within the phrase "properties
mentioned" as ised in the basic grant of lien. 50 The most tenable argu-
ment against this construction rests in the phrase "and upon the machin-
ery, materials and supplies so furnished," but, as is now apparent from
the foregoing discussion, we construe this language to mean only such
items which have become a part of the real estate and attached per-
sonalty.
Assuming that it is clearly recognized that the statute pertains only
to real property interests, still another problem is present. The Poudre
River case indicates that a lien is available to certain parties against
detached personal property which they have furnished.51 If the Poudre
River case were to stand alone, the language which provides this indi-
cation could be discounted as dictum, but the language was elevated
from this status when the same Justice who wrote the opinion stated in
the Terminal case, "and the lien upon the equipment as such is restricted
to those who furnish it, as is held in Poudre River... " The court's lan-
guage was not necessary to the decision in either case, and we believe
that it was an unfortunate implication which is an error. The dissenting
opinion in the Terminal case clearly takes the position that a lien
49 Though really determining the issue, we think, upon estoppel, emphasizing
the fact that the rig owner had contracted for indemnity against mechanics' liens
with its subcontractor through whom the lien claims arose.
The Terminal decision permitted a lien to be foreclosed against the rig, which did
not belong to the party owning an interest in the real estate, although it should be
noted that the rig owner was a party to the contract with the lien claimant. It is, of
course, proper for a contracting party to be liable for the expense incurred in fulfill-
ment of his contract, but it does not follow that a lien should be available against his
property to secure the payment of such indebtedness, since the mechanic's lien was
traditionally granted against property which benefited from labor or materials in
favor of those persons who furnished the benefit. No benefit was conferred upon the
property of the rig owner, and the dissenting opinion recognized the inequity in
permitting a lien against such property.
50 For example, machinery affixed to the well and the leasehold interest would
appear to be technically excludable from "properties mentioned."
51 The Poudre River case is somewhat anomalous. We have previously expressed
our opinion that it reached a questionable result. (See note 26, supra). The conclusion
that the plaintiff was not entitled to a lien was correct upon the facts obviously as-
sumed by the court; but the reasoning for the conclusion was not in point, and the
facts appear to be different from the basis assumed by the court. The court said,
"One furnishing only labor has not created value in the machinery and equipment
as detached personal property, but only in the well itself and the leasehold interest,
and upon these the statute gives him a lien." We believe that the real basis of the
decision lies in the court's expressed assumption that the properties against which
the lien was claimed were detached personal property; and if this were actually the
case the court's decision would be in full accord with the statutory interpretation to
which we have adhered. However, the actual facts in the case showed that the lien
was claimed against, among other properties, "a rig, rig irons, steel crown blocks.
string of 10" casing in the hole, other casing upon location, drilling line and sand
line." Without concluding whether the rig was affixed or portable under the facts,
the "string of 10" casing in the hole" would not be detached personal property but
instead a part of the well 4tructure, subject to the liens of laborers and materialmen
alike.
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against detached personal property is not contemplated by the specific
statute, and says nothing with reference to an exception in favor of the
party supplying the detached personal property. Practically speaking,
the specific question is not a great problem, except from the standpoint
of procedure, since the vendor of such property can be protected apart
from the specific statute as detailed below.
We have previously noted that the 1929 statute, which is the basis
for the specific statute in its present form, followed closely the determi-
nation of the Poudre River and Terminal cases, and that we consider
this to be more than a coincidence.- We believe that the 1929 Act was
an attempt to approve the dissenting view expressed in the Terminal
case that no lien is available againit detached personal property. We are
not entirely satisfied, however, that the act clearly repudiates the result
implied in Poudre River that a materialman would have a lien against
the detached personal property which he has furnished; but again we
interpret the act in the light of the underlying theory of a mechanics'
lien. The mechanics' lien is non-consensual, 53 and as such should be
limited to those situations where the parties are unable, as a practical
matter, to contract for security. The vendor of detached personal prop-
erty can protect himself by permitting only a qualified or limited title
to pass to the purchaser through the use of a conditional sale contract
or a chattel mortgage;5 4 and even without an express security contract
he may possibly have an inchoate right to reclaim the detached personal
property,-" as witness the tacitly approved action of the defendant
Panuco in the Terminal case. 56 As well, the materialman has a lien
against the real property interests of the contracting party served by
such detached personal property, as discussed in more detail hereinafter,
for the value of such service.
The foregoing considerations of theory relative to the nature of
the property and property interests subject to lien rights under the
statutes must constantly be borne in mind as specific classes of property
and property rights are examined to determine their lienable nature.
These considerations may be summarized as follows:
(a) Both the general and specific statutes contemplate lien rights only
against interests in realty.
(b) Detached or unaffixed personalty cannot be made the subject of a
lien under the statutes regardless of its ownership.
(c) Attached or affixed personalty is subject to liens granted by the
statutes, subject only to prior valid recorded rights.
Confining our analysis to a normal oil and gas well operation and with-
52 See the first section of this article, note 27, supra (34 DICTA at 215).
53 Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 36 §§ 6 and 25 (1955).
54 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-3 (1953). If full title is not permitted to pass
to the purchaser, and notice of such fact is properly recorded before possession is
delivered to the purchaser, the security interest retained as a part of the sale trans-
action should take priority over a mechanic's lien even though the date of inception
of the right to the lien predates the date of recording. See American Law of Property,
§ 16.106H (1952). The "extent of the right, title and interest" of the purchaser would
never exceed his equity under these circumstances.
55 Cf. Rice v. Cassells, 48 Colo. 73, 108 Pac. 1001 (1910); Bethlehem Supply Corp.
v. Wotola Royalty Corp., 140 Tex. 9, 165 S.W.2d 443 (1942). But See Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 121-1-56 (1953).
56 See note 33 supra. The defendant, Panuco Exploration Co., had gone upon the
property and removed the items of machinery which it had supplied and for which
it was unpaid. The court concluded that the property was not subject to a lien since
it was not a part of the oil well for the purposes of the lien statutes. It should be
noted by way of caution that the court was not faced with the problem of determining
the relative rights of the parties as between Panuco and the party to whom it had
sold the machinery.
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out attempting to cover the other types of oil and gas operations de-
scribed in the specific statute, we provide a check list of lienable
property and property interests as follows:
LEASEHOLD INTERESTS
Landowner's Royalty and the Mineral Fee: The Terminal case
should leave little question that the fee mineral estate and the land-
owner's royalty cannot be reached by liens under the general act and
under the predecessor to the specific act. It denies the argument for find-
ing a statutory agency between the landowner and his lessee, holds that
there is no basis in contract, and limits the lien there asserted to the
lessee interests. Further, the present specific act removes the landowner
from any liability except, of course, where he contracts with the lien
claimant.
57
Overriding Royalty Interests; Production Payments: The same rea-
soning which in the Terminal case prohibited attachment of liens to a
landowner's interest should preserve the so-called overriding royalty
interests and also production payments which were created and recorded
prior to the commencement of work operations. These are estates sepa-
rate from that of the working interest owner who contracts for the im-
provements. There is no greater element of agency between the holders
of such interests and the working interest owner than there is between
such owner and the base lessor since these are non-expense-bearing inter-
ests. If on no other basis, they may be preserved on the theory that they
are a prior encumbrance against the leasehold.58
Carried Working Interests and Net Profit Interests: Quite com-
monly the owner of an oil and gas lease may transfer or reserve a given
fraction of his working interest estate on the following basis:
(a) The holder of the working interest residue may agree that he will
pay, for the holder of the fractional part, that portion of the drilling
and completion expenses or that portion of either the drilling or
completion expenses which would otherwise be paid by such holder
for any well drilled on the lease; or
(b) The holder of the residue may agree to "advance" on the part of
the fractional holder the latter's share of either drilling or com-
pleting costs, or both of such costs, and subsequently recover such
expenditure from the fractional holder's share of production.
Such fractional interests are commonly referred to as "carried interests."
Cases from other jurisdictions go both directions in answering the ques-
tion of their susceptibility to mechanics' liens.59 It is arguable that they,
like overriding royalty interests, are encumbrances against the working
interest. The difficulty we see to this position is that the holders of
these estates come dangerously close to standing in an agency relation-
ship with the residue working interest, at least for lien purposes. They
have all of the incidents of control and chargeability of costs attendant
to a consenting working interest, and are distinct only on the basis that
57 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-11 (1953).
58 An excellent case on this point is M. E. Roberts v. Dock Tice. 198 Ark. 397, 129
S.W.2d 258, 122 A.L.R. 1177 (1939), decided under the Arkansas statute, which con-
tains language similar to the Colorado specific act.
59 In Weir v. Janecki Mfg. Co., 254 Ky. 738, 72 S.W.2d 450 (1933) the carried
interest was held immune to the lien, but in Ball v. Red Square Oil and Gas Co., 113
Kan. 763, 216 Pac. 422 (1923) the lien attached to the carried interest. The distinctions
between the Kentucky and Kansas statute are not significant insofar as the question
immediately considered is concerned.
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the holder of the residue has contracted as between the parties to pay or
advance on their behalf their share of costs.
The same reasoning may be applied to a "net profit interest," which
is merely a contractual right on the part of one to take a given percent-
age of the net income that an oil and gas leasehold yields to a lessee.
Here, again, it is arguable that the net profit interest is in the nature of
an encumbrance upon the working interest, but it strikes us as being
an unsegregated portion of such estate, committed in agency by contract
to the working interest for lien purposes and, therefore, subject to liens.
Working Interests: Where the oil and gas lessee's interest or work-
ing interest is held in one person, there is no problem under our statutes
for it can be impressed to its entire extent with the liens given thereby.60
What, however, is the case where this estate is divided by assignment
among several owners? Where a holder of a partial working interest
consents expressly or impliedly to a development or improvement of the
leasehold and commits his interest to the program, we feel his interest,
in its entire extent, is lienable under the terms of the statutes. If he par-
ticipates in the control of the program, he is an owner, part owner, or
lessee, contracting with the lien claimant, as required by the acts. If he
delegates this authority by contract, even while limiting his liability,
he has created an agency or trusteeship; and under the statute his inter-
est is rendered subject to the lien even though he may not be liable
for the deficiency debt.61
Where, however, a holder of a partial working interest is noncon-
senting, there cannot be a contractual basis for a lien, either directly or
by agency, and the lien would fail.
62
If the provisions 63 of the general act which require that a non-
consenting owner post notice of his non-liability following knowledge
of improvements are applicable in pari materia to the specific statute,
a non-consenting working interest holder should protect himself by so
doing.64 In any event, until the question of applicability is clarified this
would be an advisable practice to follow.
A particularly perplexing problem in this area arises with respect
to working interests which are totally or partially "farmed out." Often a
company holding a large area under lease will contract with another
company to drill a test well in the area. Within the industry these con-
tractual arrangements are called farmout contracts. The company own-
ing the lease is normally called a "farmor," and the company which
agrees to drill the well is called the "farmee." The agreements vary in
substance, but generally they provide that if the farmee drills a well to
a given depth at a specified location within a limited time and grants
the farmor access to information obtained during drilling, the farmor
will then convey to the farmee either a divided or an undivided interest
in its leasehold estate or a portion thereof.
A significant fact under this type of contract is that the farmee's
interest is contingent. If the farmee does not perform the required act,
60 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-1 (1953) specifically provides that the lien shall
run to all of the right, title and interest, leasehold or otherwise, of the owner or lessee.
61 See discussion relative to deficiency liability infra.
62 The specific act limits the interests which can be reached to those belonging
to the contracting party or parties. See also J. S. Abercrombie Co. v. Lehulu Oil Co.,
181 La. 644, 160 So. 126 (1935) (decided at a time when the Louisiana statutes re-
quired a contractual basis for the lien; this is no longer required in that state);
Oil Well Supply Co. v. Independent Oil Co.. 219 La. 935, 54 So. 2d 330 (1951).
63 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-3-5 (1953).
64 We doubt that the referred to section of the general act does apply pari materia
to the specific act. See discussion relative to enforcement, infra.
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it does not acquire any interest in the leasehold and title remains abso-
lute in the farmor. Under these circumstances it becomes necessary to
determine whether a lien claimant for work done on the well may reach
the farmor's retained interest in the leasehold (presuming that the
farmee has fully performed his agreement), or whether such claimant
may reach the farmor's leasehold in the event of default by the farmee.
It is unfortunate that the Terminal case did not reveal either in the
decision or in the trial record the terms of the agreement between the
original lessee, Municipal Oil, Inc., and Terminal Drilling Co., for it is
possible that such agreement may have been in the nature of a farmout
contract. In its absence there is no definitive authority in this state other
than the statutes themselves.
The problem becomes one of statutory agency, and in our opinion
agency exists. In the absence of agency between the farmor and farmee
a claimant could reach only the farmee's interest, which is contingent
in its inception and then vested upon the farmee's unilateral perform-
ance. Cases of other jurisdictions reach opposed results as to whether
there is or is not statutory agency between these parties.65
Because they run the gamut of both views and because of similar-
ities between the lien statute there under consideration and our own
specific act, the Brooks and Etheridge cases66 deserve particular note.
The factual narratives in the cases leave little question that a farmout
arrangement existed between the Superior Oil Co., as farmor, and one
McSpadden, as farmee. The United States District Court (Arkansas) in
the Brooks case67 denied a lien against the farmor's interest and limited
the claimant to a right against McSpadden's contingent interest, which,
since there had been a default by him, was virtually no right at all. The
Arkansas Supreme Court then ruled in the Etheridge case68 that McSpad-
den was both "agent" and "contractor" for Superior in the statutory
sense and gave a lien against the leasehold and also apparently against
personalty, both detached and attached. We feel that there are factors
in the Etheridge case which make it misleading authority relative to a
farmor-farmee arrangement. Most significant of these is the fact that the
65 Brooks v. Superior Oil Co. 198 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1952), reversing Brooks v.
Superior Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 641 (D.Ark. 1952); Superior Oil v. Etheriege, 219 Ark.
289, 242 S.W.2d 718, (1951). Also see J. S. Abercrombie Co. v. Lehulu Oil Co., 181 La.
644, 160 So. 126 (1935) (which may have involved farmout estate although court talks
in terms of "sub-lease"); O'Brien v. Greene Production Co., Tex. Civ. App., 151
S.W.2d 900 (1941); Hoffman v. Continental Supply Co., Tex. Civ. App., 120 S.W.2d
851, modified, 135 Tex. 522, 144 S.W.2d 253 (1938).
66 See note 65 supra.
67 96 F. Supp. 641 (D.Ark. 1952).
68 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951).
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court viewed. Superior's agreement as a "turnkey contract,"6 9 which,
of course, it was not, since Superior had no interest in the well other
than in the technical data it yielded. Also, the Arkansas court laid great
stress on the fact that Superior had prohibited recording of the agree-
ment, which implies an estoppel against Superior to deny agency. In any
event, the Etheridge case became controlling as to Arkansas law and the
United States circuit court was obligated to reverse the district court's
trial decision in the Brooks case.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the ultimate result of these
cases, they are forceful authority in the instant situation and should be
constantly considered by those who advise clients relative to their rights
and liabilities under farmout contracts. It might be helpful from a
farmor's standpoint to specifically refute agency in the contract and to
require recording of the agreement. Perhaps, also, the result of the
Brooks case could be altered by assigning the farmee his interest in the
lease prior to work commencement, subject to disfeasance for failure to
perform. We see no security in any of these suggestions, however, and
submit that the best insurance is in the form of bonding the farmee for
payment of his costs.
Unitized Leaseholds: The specific statute lays the lien right against
enumerated properties including the well upon which the benefit was
conferred, "and upon all other wells .. . and the interest, leasehold, or
otherwise . . ." of the owner, part owner, or lessee, to the extent of his
69 A "turnkey contract" is normally viewed within the oil industry as an agree-
ment between a lease owner and a drilling contractor providing for the drilling of
a well at a fixed price for the owner's account. The significance in this is that the
owner has and retains an ownership interest in the well.
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interest. As previously noted, the mining section of the general act pro-
vides that when two or more deposits are worked in common they shall,
for purposes of the act, be presumed to be a single mine.
Today it is a common practice to group separately-owned leases
into a single plan for development through devices of unitization and
pooling. Under the provisions of the acts specified above it can be
asserted that a lien right may be claimed against all lienable property
belonging to a lienable interest holder in the entire unit area for work
performed upon a single well within the area. Cases arising under other
statutes permit such a result.7 0 The claimant must, of course, still satisfy
the requirements of basing his claim in contract and of describing and




Attached Equipment and Machinery: Once casing and other pro-
duction machinery and equipment such as tanks, pumps, pipe, etc., are
affixed, they become lienable under both the specific and general
statute.
7 2
Detached Equipment and Machinery: It is always troublesome to
take a definitive position on questions of law where answers are not
clear, and certainly this category presents such a problem. We have pre-
viously discussed the matter in general terms and specifically affirm our
position here that we do not think that our general and specific statutes,
when properly construed, permit the liens there given to attach to por-
table well drilling and servicing equipment and machinery, nor to well
materials and equipment such as casing, pumps, tanks and fittings deliv-
ered to and stacked at the well site but not consumed in the well or not
affixed thereto.
There are numerous cases, primarily from Louisiana, allowing liens
to attach to detached personalty, principally to drilling equipment.
73
These cases should all be viewed in the light that they arise under spe-
cific oil and gas statutes which differ severely in their language from
our specific statute.
7 4
Produced Oil: There is one special class of personalty that should
70 Oil Field Salvage v. Simon, 140 Tex. 456, 168.S.W.2d 848 (1943). Cases involving
liens asserted under a mining statute are Standard Pipe and Supply Co. v. Red
Rock Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 897, 135 P.2d 659 (1943); Standard Pipe and Supply Co. v.
Marvin, 43 Cal. App. 2d 230, 110 P.2d 476 (1941). On this question careful attention
should be given to the terms of the unit or pooling agreement when the pleadings
for lien foreclosure are drawn. Generally these contracts provide that the leases com-
mitted to the agreement are to be developed as a single and entire leasehold.
71 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 54 A.LR. 1549 (1928).
The form of lien statement set forth, infra, should carry the entire unit area descrip-
tion in the space provided for a land description.
72 Poudre River Oil Corp. v. Carey, 83 Colo. 419, 266 Pac. 201 (1928) denied a
laborer's lien against casing in the hole, and thereby impliedly held it to be detached
personalty. The question of annexation is in all instances a factual one and the varying
results of our cases make it difficult to set forth any fully definitive guide for its
determination. A general analysis of the question and a summary of different case
results can be found in Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 36 (1948).
73 Compare Meyer v. Latta, 178 Kan. 316, 285 P.2d 782 (1955); with Given v. Camp-
bell, 127 Kan. 378, 273 Pac. 442 (1929); Idom v. Mass, La. App., 32 So. 2d 411 (1947),
(rig removed before lien attached); Sargent v. Freeman, 204 La. 997, 16 So. 2nd 737
(1944); Odom v. McClanahan, La. App., 196 So. 382 (1940); Smith v. Benson, 262 P.2d
438, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 1420 (Okla. 1953).
74 Louisiana Laws, Act. No. 68, § 1 (1942) and its successor Act. No. 100, § 1
(1955) direct the lien (privilege) to drilling rigs and machinery attached to or located
on the leasehold. Separate sections for enforcement of the liens (privileges) against
movable and immovable property are provided. Kan. Gen. Stats. § 55-207 (1935) pro-
vides that the lien shall extend to the fixtures and appliances used in operating for
oil and gas purposes. Okla. Stat. Ann. § 144 places the lien upon any "oil well sup-
plies, tools and other articles used in digging."
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be dealt with in detail, and this is produced oil. In the ground oil is
realty75 and is therefore, of course, impressed with the liens arising
under the statutes here considered. Upon notification of the existence
of lien rights, crude oil purchasers will suspend their payments for pro-
duced oil on the theory that it was impressed with the lien right prior
to severance. What then of the oil which was produced and stored or
sold prior to the time that the lien attached? Again there is no fully
definitive authority in this state, but the better view elsewhere, we feel,
holds that upon severance the oil or proceeds therefor are not subject
to the lien on the theory that they are not included within the lienable
properties specified in the statute, which is the case with our statute.7 6
PARTIES WHO MAY ASSERT THE LIEN
Next analyzed are the classes who may assert liens against oil and
gas properties in Colorado. A constant consideration, especially at this
phase, is the statutory necessity that the lien right must be based in con-
tract, express or implied. 7 Under the general statute the lien claimant
must plead and prove that he rendered his benefit at the instance of the
owner or his agent, with those who have charge of construction being
presumed agents. 78 Similarly, under the specific statute the benefit must
be conferred by virtue of a contract express or implied with the owner
or part owner or lessee of any interest in real estate or with the trustee,
agent or receiver of any such owner, part owner, or lessee.
7 9
Laborers: In this general class we include toolpushers, tool dressers,
drillers, roustabouts (in short, all members of a normal drilling crew, ex-
cept watchmen) ,8o carpenters,"' repairmen,
82 truck drivers, 83 "cat men,
8 4
and all other persons whose contribution is one of physical labor.85
75 1 Summers, Oil and Gas, 28 (1954).
76 Garey v. Rufus Lillard Co., 196 Okla. 421, 165 P.2d 344 (1945); Stanolind Crude
Oil Purchasing Co. v. Busey, 185 Okla. 200, 90 P.2d 876 (1939). The statutes of some
states (Arkansas, Louisiana and Wyoming) specifically allow the lien to reach the
produced minerals or their proceeds.
77 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 54 A.L.R. 1549 (1928).
Interesting cases on this point are Sklar v. Oil Incomes, Inc., 133 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.
1943); Pace v. National Bank of Commerce, 190 Okla. 503, 125 P.2d 178 (1942); and
Lange Cable Tool Drilling Co. v. Barnett Petroleum Corp., 142 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940). See Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado, 67-84 (1948) for collection of
Colorado cases on this point. Also, see Roberts v. Dock Tice, 198 Ark. 397, 129
S.W.2d 258, 122 A.L.R. 1177 (1939). Caveat: Louisiana's specific oil and gas statute
does not now contain a requirement that there be a direct contractual basis
to the lien, Oil Well Supply Co. v. Independent Oil Co., 219 La. 935, 54 So. 2d 330
(1951), and this is most significant in appraising the cases of that jurisdiction. Even
in that state the lien right does not inure to a mere volunteer of services. Willis v.
Mills Tooke Properties, 42 So. 2d 548 (Ia. App. 1949). So it is questionable whether the
requirement for contract is negated entirely in that state.
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-3-1 (1953).
79 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-1 (1953).
80 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549 (1928)
(granted liens to a truck driver, a driller, and a tooldresser). The claimants in Pace
v. National Bank of Commerce. 190 Okla. 503, 125 P.2d 178 (1942) were a pumper and
a roustabout. The lien of a watchman (and scout) was denied in Gleason v. Twin
Cities Drilling Co., 183 So. 67 (La. App. 1938) but on the basis that the services were
not rendered during the drilling cf a well. See also Donaldson v. Orchard Crude Oil
Co., 6 Cal. App. 641, 92 Pac. 1046 (1907); Bell Oil and Refining Co. v. Price, 251 S.W.
559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
S1 Superior Oil v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951) grants a lien for
carpentry and lumber. The case appears correct insofar as it accords a lien to this
type of claimant, but can be criticized insofar as it allows the lien against an oil and
gas "farmor's" retained or reversionary interest.
82 Sargent v. Freeman, 204 La. 997, 16 So. 2d 737 (1944) allows a repairman's
lien, for work done upon unattached personalty, a generator, to run against realty
interests. As we use the term "repairman" here we would confine its meaning to
those who render repair services to installed and affixed machinery.
83 Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549 (1928).
84 An earth moving contractor and operator was denied a lien for roadwork and
backfilling in Willis v. Mills Tooke Properties, 42 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 1949) but on
the basis that the plaintiff had, in effect, volunteered his services.
85 Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929).
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There are, even under the specific statute, some very special prob-
lems attendant to this class of claimant and also to other classes which
should be noted in summary here. In some jurisdictions the phase or
"time" during which the expenditure of labor was made, and also to
some extent the "situs" of expenditure have come to be factors. To illu-
strate this, assume that a bulldozer operator, under a contract with a
lessee or his drilling contractor, performs the following labor items
during three phases of an oil and gas well program:
(a) Prior to the time drilling is commenced the operator cuts out an
access road from the highway to the location and grades and levels
the location.
(b) During the time that the well is drilling the operator cuts reserve
pits and levels an additional parking and storage area.
(c) After drilling he levels the location, "chisels" the roadway and
park area, backfills the pits attendant to abandonment of the well
or else does further excavating for the installation of completion
equipment.
It is possible in the- face of these circumstances to argue that the
operator does not qualify for a lien under the specific statute as to the
work items rendered in phases (a) and (c) because he did not expend
his labor at a time when a well was being sunk, repaired, altered or
operated. Such a contention has been accepted elsewhere."8
so In Willis v. Mills Tooke Properties, 42 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 1949) a lien was
denied because the service was rendered after installation of production equipment
and not during the drilling phase as well as on the ground that the plaintiff's services
were not ordered. The dissent argues that case should turn on the basis that services
were not ordered and implies that there should be a lien for services performed after
drilling. Big Three Welding and Equip. Co. v. Crutcher, 149 Tex. 204, 229 S.W.2d 600
(1949) (denies lien against realty for services rendered to the dismantling of a portion
of a pipeline).
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It is also arguable that the operator, particularly as to his work on
the roadway and removed parking area, did not render his labors at
the "situs" contemplated by the statute; by this we mean that he did not
bestow his benefit upon the well itself.8" These contentions could be
made against any type of labor or contractor claimant or against the
supplier of expendable items rendering benefits during the phases pre-
ceding or following actual drilling, or upon operations not at the actual
drillsite. We do not feel that the statutory language should be so nar-
rowly construed.88 Rather, the decisions of our Supreme Court indicate
that every act essential to the well endeavor is a part of the endeavor
itself and that there is not a terminus of the endeavor until all essential
parts are completed.8 9 Since the drilling of any oil and gas well contem-
plates and necessitates the performance of certain preparatory opera-
tions in the phase prior to actual drilling, and also the performance of
abandonment operations (if the well is dry) or completion operations
(if productive) in the phase following drilling we feel that the better
view extends the terms "drilling and operating" to include expenditures
of services and supplies made during all three phases,90 and also deems
these expenditures as being made "upon or ... for" the well and other
lienable property if they are expended upon operations related and
necessarily incident to the actual drilling of the well.8 1
Surveyors: In our opinion it does not require an unduly broad
construction of the specific statute to hold that the surveyor who stakes
location, lays out access roads, or who defines lease lines and corners,
has performed labor for the "sinking, repairing, altering or operating"
of a well. There is, however, a separate section of the general act 92 which
grants a lien to surveyors and civil and mining engineers who do any
work of surveying or plotting of mineral deposits. Undeniably, this pro-
vision was intended to afford a lien to mine surveyors, but a liberal
construction of its language allows its applicability to oil and gas opera-
tions. By our view, the rights and statutory requirements of this class of
claimant are defined by the specific act.
Technicians: Quite commonly certain technical personal services
are rendered during oil and gas drilling operations, such as those of a
consultant geologist, 3 core analyst, mud analyst, log analyst, and test
engineers.
We think a lien in favor of these persons could be justified under
the wording of the general statute on the basis that they are "engineers"
rendering professional services, but the Colorado cases are not clear;94
87 Willis v. Mills Tooke Properties, 42 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 1949).
88 Cases of other states evidencing a more liberal approach on this question in-
clude Gourley v. Iverson Tool Co., 186 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) (plaintiff al-
lowed lien though his work was rendered on well machinery in his shop several miles
from well). Note also Superior Oil v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951);
Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249 Pac. 717 (1926).
89 Western Elaterite Roofing Co. v. Fisher, 85 Colo. 5, 273 Pac. 19 (1928); Curtis
v. McCarthy, 53 Colo. 284, 125 Pac. 109 (1912).
90 Like Colorado, the Oklahoma statute does not specifically authorize a lien for
services rendered during abandonment but in Indo Oil Co. v. Bennett, 202 Okla. 300,
213 P.2d 546 (1949) plaintiff was allowed a lien for services rendered during plugging
operations.
91 Labor and materials for a plank roadway to the location formed the basis
for a lien in Superior Oil Co. v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951). In
Terminal Drilling Co. v. Jones, 84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549 (1928), the
court allowed a lien for labor to one whose function was driving a truck to and from
the well.
92 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-3-21 (1953).
93 Lindemann v. Belden Consol. Min. and Mill. Co., 16 Colo AIP. 342, 65 Pac.
403 (1901) (denied lien to geologist).
94 Ibid.
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and such technicians in their own right may not possess lien rights under
the wording of either our specific statute or general statute by the argu-
ment that they do not perform labor or furnish material within the
statutory sense. 95 Their protection may lie only in advance payment of
fees.
Drilling Contractors: By express statement the drilling contractor
has a lien under the specific statute. It is significant that his account will
normally include items not only for labor and services but also for sup-
plies and materials purchased by him and expended upon the well.
It is well to note at this point a problem of general theory which
could occasion difficulty. This is the possible distinction between an
individual claimant and a contractor or subcontractor claimant. We
have stated previously that "cat men," truck drivers, carpenters, and
members of drilling crews have lien rights as "laborers" meaning thereby
that as individuals their contribution is one of labor. Below, segregated
classes of "materialmen" and their correlative lien rights are discussed,
and here again our approach is on an individual basis. The question
then arises as to whether the results reached as to these individual situa-
tions are changed by the fact that they are merged into a contracted
service. We think not. To illustrate this, presume that a drilling con-
tractor agrees to drill a well to the point of setting casing on a "turnkey"
basis, and that pursuant to such agreement he not only furnishes and
pays for all necessary labor and third party services but also he supplies
and pays for all surface pipe, cement, water, fuel, and other materials
and supplies consumed in the drilling. There is some doubt that the
contractor may use as a basis for lien the rental value of his machinery
and equipment; 96 but otherwise his account, at least insofar as it is com-
posed of items for which a lien is given by the statute, forms the basis
for a valid lien with theoretically the same net result as if liens were
filed by the individual laborers and suppliers who expended services or
supplies upon the well. 97 Moreover, we feel that the better view would
give him a lien to the full extent of his account as based upon the con-
tract price. 98
95 This was the argument accepted in Lindemann v. Belden Consol. Min. and
_Jill. Co., 16 Colo. App. 342, 65 Pac. 403 (1901).
96 See Wilkinson v. Pacific Midwest Oil Co., 152 Kan. 712, 107 P.2d 726 (1940);
Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249 Pac. 717 (1926).
97 Superior Oil Co. v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718 (1951).
98 So holding, but of limited value on this point because they relate to the
general act are Great Western Sugar Co. v. Gilcrest Lumber Co., 25 Colo. App. 1, 136
Pac. 553 (1913); Armour & Co. v. McPhee & McGinnity Co., 85 Colo. 262, 275 Pac. 12
(1929).
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Common Carriers: Even a liberal interpretation of the language of
the specific and general acts does not, in our opinion, justify a lien to
common carriers who transport equipment or supplies to the well, since
they do not perform labor upon or furnish materials to it. Such class
does, however, have a separate statutory lien,9 but only against the per-
sonalty transported.
Fencing Contractors: Tank batteries and other production equip-
ment are often fenced as a protection for and a protection against per-
sons and livestock. To our minds this is a necessary incident to the well,
if not to its "sinking" then to its "operating," and consequently we
would find a lien for those who perform labor or furnish supplies in
this regard.
The various separate classes enumerated above embrace largely the
types who would confer personal services or "labor" to an oil and gas
drilling operation, or who confer both labor and material to such an
operation. It is recognized that there are certain other types of profes-
sional and trades people who would confer indirect benefits to a drilling
operation, such as landmen, lawyers and accountants; but, for the most
part, their rights to non-consensual liens are based upon statutes other
than those which are studied here and affect property and property
interests not significant to this discussion.' 0
Suppliers of Expendable Well Materials: Within this class are those
materialmen who furnish materials which are in a sense "consumed"
during the drilling of a well. The more common types of such supplies
are: water, 101 drilling "mud," fuel,' lumber, cement, explosives, "frac-
ing" and acidizing fluids, chemicals, lost circulation materials, and other
additives. It seems clear that such suppliers have furnished "materials"
to the sinking or operating of the well and therefore have a lien right
under the specific statute.
Suppliers of Drilling Machinery and Parts: Instances have arisen
and will arise where the vendors of portable drilling and servicing
machinery, and parts for the same, attempt to assert liens under statutes
of the type under consideration.' 0' In our opinion, since these claimants
confer their benefit solely upon detached personalty and not upon the
"improvement" for which the statutes give a lien, they should be
denied liens against the lienable properties under the specific statute.'0 1
Suppliers of Well Equipment: Those who supply casing, tubing,
tanks, pumps, pipes, fittings, separators, treaters, and other production
equipment which is installed and affixed to the well and leasehold, have
a lien under our specific statute.
Suppliers of Service Tools: One of the most difficult classes to
appraise is that comprised of those who furnish special tools and equip-
99 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-1-4 (1953).
100 See Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929). It is hoped that nothing
contained in this paragraph misleads brethren of the matron profession to overlook
their attorney's lien rights under Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1-10 et seq. (1953).
101 Although water is one of the basic elements, the same fact which makes Its
haulage necessary in this area, to-wit, its scarcity, makes it a thing of value and
hence it constitutes a material or supply.
102 Fuel is a specifically enumerated supply in the special statute, Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 86-5-1 (1953).
103 See Sklar v. Oil Incomes, Inc., 133 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1943), in which a lien
was denied to a vendor of drilling machinery attempting to assert a lien against
a leasehold interest upon which a well had been drilled by his vendee as an inde-
pendent contractor.
104 The reasoning of Sklar v. Oil Incomes, Inc., supra, note 103, can be applied
to our own specific act on this question.
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ment, often on a contracted basis, which includes operating personnel.
Here we would include bit companies, and those special service houses
that furnish core barrels, reamers, shoes, fishing tools, directional drill-
ing tools, jet perforating equipment, "fracing" equipment, electrical
testing units, and mud logging equipment. Some such suppliers, such as
bit companies, furnish only equipment (usually on a rental basis).
Others, i.e., electric log companies, furnish both equipment and operat-
ing personnel. For the purposes of determining ultimate result, we do
not feel that this difference should be significant because in either case
essentially what is furnished is a benefit conferring service. In one
instance the service is comprised of equipment and in the other it is
comprised of equipment and personnel, but they both equate to a service
which is necessary for the sinking, repairing, altering, or operating of
the well.
While the specific or general statutes do not employ the term"services," still if a service involves the furnishing or rendering, even in
part, of labor, machinery or material (and most do) it appears that a
lien for the service, to the extent of its entire contracted price, should
be allowed. This is by no means a strain of the statutory language, since
the price of "materials" for which a lien is given is composed in large
part of services and profit of the supplier.
Much of the difficulty in this area arises from those cases of other
jurisdictions denying a lien based upon the rental value of equipment. 10 5
We feel that a different rule should prevail in Colorado because the
classes of claimant, at least under the specific act, broadly embrace not
only those who confer a benefit by virtue of furnishing labor and mate-
rial for the purposes of sinking, repairing, altering or operating the well,
but also include those who furnish machinery for such purposes. These
cases are also distinguishable on other grounds.
CLAIMING AND ENFORCING THE LIEN
As a preliminary and necessary step to discussing enforcement of
the lien we should examine briefly the problem of avoiding the lien.
There is no provision in the specific statute under which an owner
or part owner of a lease interest could avoid lien liability, presuming
that the required contractual basis between such person and the claimant
is established expressly or by implication."" In view of this, the only
complete safeguard a contracting owner can obtain is to bond his prime
105See Wilkinson v. Pacific Midwest Oil Co., 152 Kan. 712, 107 P.2d 726 (1940);
Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249 Pac. 717 (1926).
106 See discussion, supra, relative to property interests subject to the lien.
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drilling contractor as to performance and as to payment of his obli-
gations incurred for the well. This is a recommended practice from a
great many standpoints, too often ignored in the oil industry when con-
tractors of questionable stability are employed, because bonding costs
are generally passed on to the owner. To our minds, however, the threat
of being obligated to pay twice for a $100,000 well should always out-
weigh the burden of paying a $1,000 bond premium.
Aside from bonding, one could argue that the doctrine of pari
materia announced in the Terminal case could conceivably extend the
contract recording benefits of the general act 1 7 to persons rendered sub-
ject to liens under the specific act. This points up the difficulties which
arise in applying the rule of pari materia, even upon the theory which we
have advanced, where the specific statute is silent and the general statute
speaks. It does not necessarily follow from these circumstances that the
provision in the general statute controls. And, as we indicated in the
first installment of this article, there are conflicts within the specific
statute itself which no form of application of the rule of pari materia
can resolve.
In the event that the recording provisions of the general statute
are applicable, a contracting owner, whose agreement provides for pay-
ment to the contractor in an amount exceeding $500, may record his
agreement and thereafter be protected against lien claimants on the
basis that he shifts to them the responsibility for notifying him of their
claims. He must, of course, then exercise his privilege of withholding
funds. The contract itself must qualify under the statute in that it must
involve a payment in excess of $500, no part of which can be payable in
advance of the time work commences. Installment payments after work
commences, upon the basis of estimated costs, are permissible but at
least 15% of the contract price must be withheld for thirty-five days
following completion of the contract operation. 1°8 We offer this only as
a suggestion, and certainly there is no assurance that future decisions
will permit this protective feature of the general act to apply against
liens asserted under the specific act.
For owners who are in a sense noncontracting or nonconsenting,
such as farmors and the holders of carried working interests (supra),
we feel their protection must lie through bonding the person who con-
tracts for operations. Their lien liability rests, if at all, upon a theory of
implied agency or trusteeship under the statutes; and if this is found,
their property becomes subject to the lien as if they had personally con-
tracted with the claimant. This being the case, there would not be
relief for such persons even if the provisions for giving notice of non-
liability contained in the general act were deemed applicable to the
specific statute. As stated earlier, such provisions if applicable in pari
materia to the specific statute might be employed to protect a non-
consenting working interest owner.
The problems of whether the protective features of the general act
107 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86-3-1, 86-3-2 (1953).
108 This time period for which the final payment must be held is a graphic example
of the difficulties inherent in applying this portion of the general act pari materia to
the spec-ific act. The thirty-five days specified is designed to embrace the ultimate
date. following completion, that a laborer's lien can be filed under the general act.
Under the specific act he has six months from the last date he furnished labor.
Therefore, for one working during the last days of the well operation and filing his
lien close to the end of his time for filing, the deferment in payment required by the
general act would be of no assistance.
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apply in turn raise the problems which the practitioner faces in attempt-
ing to determine whether notice should be served upon the owner of
the property interest against which the lien is claimed. The specific
statute contains no provision such as the one appearing in the general
statute which permits such notice. The manner in which the 1903 spe-
cific statute was written would have required the conclusion that the
notice provided by the general statute was necessary to give the fullest
protection to the claimant. The present specific statute, however, pro-
vides its own requirements in many respects, and it is not easy to deter-
mine exactly what provisions of the general law "are necessary and con-
venient to the enjoyment of the full benefits of the lien conferred by
the specific statute." 109 The safe approach for the practitioner, of course,
is to serve the notice; however, this is easier said than done in many of
the oil and gas lien situations, since it is not unusual for the owners
of the leasehold to be in absentia upon the determination that a drilling
program has resulted in a dry hole.
Although directing its remarks to the general statute, the Wyoming
court1 has aptly described the purpose in requiring service of notice by
pointing out that the property owner against whose interest the lien is
claimed should be warned against paying the principal contractor while
there are outstanding claims existing in favor of laborers or material-
men.' Since we are dealing in mechanics' liens with a situation where
the property subject to the lien is frequently owned by some party other
than the party owing the debt,"' we think that it is desirable to require
service of notice upon the property owner insofar as possible, where
there is a provision for avoiding liability. This is a matter for future
clarification by the legislature, however, both as to the problem of lien
avoidance through contract recording and as to the permissiveness and
effect of serving notice of the lien. Until so clarified we do not think a
claimant under the specific act should be deemed to have any burden
relative to the service of his lien statement, but in the absence of a judi-
cial determination of the point in Colorado, we think that it would be
advisable for the lien claimant to be in a position to show service or a
bona fide attempt to obtain service of the notice.
Enforcement of the lien granted by the specific statute involves the
filing of a verified statement pertaining to the claim within six months
from the date on which the lien claimant furnished the last item of
material or performed the last service of labor."'
Limitations of space do not permit even a survey approach to the
problems attendant to preparing the lien statement; but in the hope of
meeting some of the questions which are present, we submit the follow-
ing form of lien statement:
109 See the first section of this article, 34 DICTA at 215.
10 We have pointed out our observation that the specific statute closely follows
the language and format of the 1919 Wyoming statute. The Wyoming statute did not
contain any provision for service of notice; and the present Wyoming statute con-
tains such a provision only in connection with a lien against oil runs, this latter
provision being enacted in 1955.
111 Jordan v. Natrona Lumber Co., 52 Wyo. 393, 75 P.2d 378 (1938).
112 Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 22 (1955).
113 Coo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-4 (1953). See the statutory section for the detailed
requirements pertaining to the lien statement.
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NOTICE AND STATEMENT OF LIEN
T o ....................................... .................. .. ......................  .... ........... .. .... ........................................ ,
--------------.-.---------.. - - . . . --.-.-.-.--.-..-, and to all w hom it m ay concern :
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that ..............- ------------- ..................................
(of . . - ..... .. ..... . ............. ), (a C olorado corporation) (a corporation organized and
-existing under the laws of ........ .................... .................................- duly licensed to do business
within the State of Colorado), hereinafter called Claimant, wishing to avail himself
(itself) of all provisions of the statutes in such cases made and provided, does hereby
declare and state that he (it) claims and holds a lien in the amount of $ -----..............................
in accordance with the following statement of lien:
1. That the property to be charged with the lien is all of the right, title and interest,lea seh old or oth erw ise, of _......... ....................................... .........   ......  .....................................I
and of any owners, part owners or lessees in whose behalf
said named persons now act or have acted as agents or trustees, in and to all of
the following described lands:
T.. ............... . .......... , 6th P. M.
S ection ... ..... . ... ... .. .. . ................................
S e c tio n ..... . ... .................................................. ...................................
located in .................. County, Colorado, together with all appurtenances
and improvements thereto and thereon, specifically including but without limitation
the following:
(a) That certain well drilled for oil and gas (or water) described as the
(Belmont No. 1) and located (at and upon the SE 4 NW14SW% of Section
, Township . . , Range . , 6th P. M . . ...........................-- - - .....
County, Colorado) and also any other gas wells, oil wells, or other wells
(oil tanks, oil pipelines, water pipelines, pumps, pumping stations, trans-
portation or communication lines, gasoline plant, refinery and buildings)
located upon the lands described above, and
(b) Any machinery, materials and supplies furnished to the properties de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) including without limitation, -----.................- -- I
...... .... . .. .. . . . ...... .............. .... ...................................................................................... ...  ...... a
(c) Any other appurtenances to or improvements upon the properties de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) above.
'2. The within lien is claimed for and on account of work (and labor, machinery,
material, fuel, explosives, power, supplies) performed upon and furnished by claim-
ant to the sinking (repairing, altering, operating) of the properties described in
1 (a) above by virtue of a contract between claimant and ................................-........... . ........-
--..... . ..  ...... ........................................................  .. .... ------.... . .... . ...  . ... . .. ......... . . ........ . ..-
and those owners and part owners of the property described in Paragraph 1 above
in whose behalf said persons acted as agents or trustees.
'. That the just and true account of the amount due claimant because of the items
performed or furnished as specified in Paragraph 2 above after allowing all credits
is $ .... , together w ith interest thereon at the rate of ........-% for the
period ....... .......... to ....... ..... of $ . ............ .. .. .. . -
B Y -... ---- -. ------ --- ---
(Individual Verification)
;ST A T E O F .................... - ----_ ----------
) ss.
.C ou n ty of ........ .............. ........... .....-- ----- ---- )County of ---------------- . . ...- . .......... , of lawful age, being first duly
sworn upon his oath, deposes and states that he is the claimant above named and that
he has read the foregoing statement and notice of lien and account of indebtedness,
and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true and correct to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief.
Subscribed and sw orn to before m e this . . ------ day of ....................-- ..... ....... , 1957
........... M y co m m iss onex................... . ...... . ........................ .
Notary Public.
(Verification on behalf of corporation)
STATE OF . . ........ .... )
) ss.
C ou n ty of .............................. .......... )
I, ............. .......... , being of law ful age, being first duly sw orn upon m y
oath depose and state:
T h a t I a m . .................................................... o f ----------- . . . .. ..- ... ........... .- -
corporation, the claimant therein named, am authorized to make and do make the
above statement of lien and account of Indebtedness on behalf of said corporation; that
I have read the within statement of lien and account of indebtedness and know the
contents thereof and that the same is true to the best of my knowledge, information
and belief.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ... . day of -------------- .. - - - --.............., 1957
M y com m ission expires .... .. .........- _----_ .............. - .M y c m     . .. . . . . . .... . .. . . . .......... ....... . ............... ....................... .... . .... . .... . .. . . -.. . .............
Notary Public.
Suit on the statement must be commenced in the district court of
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the county in which the statement is filed "not later than" six months
after the date of filing the lien statement.
11 4
We think that no reasonable argument can be made to apply the
different enforcement provisions of the general statute as to time require-
ments for filing and foreclosing, since the specific statute is clear and
unambiguous in its requirements. It is therefore of no importance in
connection with the filing of the statement whether the lien claimant
is a laborer, materialman, subcontractor or contractor; and it is not
necessary to determine the date of completion of the improvements,
all as would be necessary under the general statute.
There is an additional remedy available to the lien claimant where
the property subject to the lien has been removed from location after
the lien has attached without the written consent of the lien claimant.
An inventory of the property so removed can be filed upon certain con-
ditions in the county to which the property has been removed and the
lien is then valid against not only the removed property, but also the
leasehold or other property with which the removed property has been
put in use."' There is a criminal penalty provided against the person
removing the property without proper consent.
Enforcement of the lien entails the often difficult question of
priorities as among various security claimants. The priority questions
stem primarily from the fact that the statute is dealing with real prop-
erty interests which include affixed or installed personal property which
can also be the subject of a personal property security transaction."-
The immediate question of priority between the lien and a chattel
mortgage is quickly disposed of by the statutory provision that the
mechanics' lien will take priority over mortgages which are not "existing
and recorded as provided by law at the time of the inception of the
lien." It is an unrelated priority provision in the statute which gives.
rise to the problem.
The statute provides that "all liens created by virtue of this Article
in any particular case shall be of equal rank and validity, except liens
for labor which shall be preferred." The clear import of all of the statu-
tory provisions 7 appears to require the construction which would estab-
lish the time of inception of the individual liens at the time the indi-
vidual lien claimant first furnished labor or materials; and there is little
room to argue that it is the intent of the statute to adopt the date speci-
fied in the general statute to which all of the general mechanics' liens
relate.
The quoted provision (that all of the liens are of equal rank and
validity) conflicts with this construction to the extent that there could
be intervening mortgage rights. This conflict has been considered none-
existent under a similar situation which developed in connection with
the general mechanics' lien statute of Nebraska. 18 The court concluded
that the Nebraska provision meant that there would be no priority as
114 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-5 (1953).
115 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-6 (1953).
116 Storke and Sears, Colorado Security Law 95 (1955).
117 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-4(3) (1953). § 86-5-1 includes the language "at
the time the work was commenced, machinery, materials and supplies were begun to,
be furnished by the lien claimant"; but this language must be restricted to a defini-
tion of the interest to which the lien attache& It is possible that the Legislature felt
that this phrase established the time of inception of the lien; but the structure of
the statute makes this phrase unquestionably a part of the description of the specific
interest subject to the lien.
118 See Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Bond, 37 Neb. 207, 55 N.W. 643 (1893).
DICTA
DICTA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1957
between lien claimants, but the respective interests of the lien claimants
attached only to the property interests available at the time of inception
of their respective liens. The effect of this construction, of course, is to
prefer one lien over another, since those which attached prior to the re-
cording of a mortgage would have first claim against all of the property
interests subject to lien, the mortgagee would be next in line as to his
claim against the specific property mortgaged, and those liens which at-
tached subsequent to the time of recording the mortgage would share in
whatever was left. Although we think the result is just, it is an anomaly
to us to say that all of the liens have equal rank and validity while per-
mitting one lien to be paid in full and another to receive a partial pay-
ment; and this result could obtain under the statute. Further, this con-
struction could result in the payment of materialmen whose liens attached
before the recording of a mortgage in preference to laborers whose liens
attached after such recording, thereby effectively negating the statutory
provision giving priority to liens for labor.
The priority of a valid recorded mortgage on the leasehold or other
interest existing prior to the attachment of any liens under the specific
statute is protected. The provision of the statute limiting the lien "to
the extent of the right, title and interest of the owner . . ." suffices to
recognize the priority of such mortgages; but even without this provi-
sion, it is ordinarily protected by constitutional limitations." 9 We think
that it would be possible under the reasoning of Joralmon v. McPhee'
2 0
for such a mortgage to be given priority over the liens which subse-
quently attach, if the mortgage is given to secure the repayment of a
loan granted for the specific purpose of providing money with which to
drill a well, and notice of such fact is given in the recorded instrument
itself.
A priority question could arise as between a lien claimant whose
lien has followed the property from its original lienable location to a
new location, as discussed above, 12 1 and lien claimants whose liens arose
out of operations at the new location upon which the "removed prop-
erty" has been placed. We believe that the equal rank and validity pro-
vision must be taken to apply to all liens arising as the result of a given
location, and that any such lien which follows the property to a new
location is prior to any new liens granted by the statute.
DEFICIENCY LIABILITY
It is extremely important that the practitioner, in attempting to
determine who is personally liable on his deficiency judgment follow-
ing lien foreclosure, bear in mind that while a given class of lease interest
holders may have a liability to the claimant in the sense that their
interests may be subjected to the claimant's lien, it does not necessarily
follow that such interest holders are personally liable to the claimant for
the debt upon which the lien was based."2
It is for this reason that in prior portions of this article in discuss-
ing situations of agency we have attempted to limit that term by the use
of the Words "statutory agency" so that it applies only to an agency for
119 See Prugh v. Imhoff, 44 Wyo. 143, 9 P.2d 152 (1932).
120 31 Colo. 26, 71 Fac. 419 (1903); see IV American Law of Property 241, § 16.1061
(1952).
121 See note 115 and related text.
122 Kern v, Guiry Bros. Co., 60 Colo. 286, 153 Pac. 87 (1915); Lowrey v. Svard,
8 Colo. App. 357, 46 Pac. 619 (1896); Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 258 (1948).
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the purpose of affixing lien liability and not for the purpose of render-
ing one liable for a debt through the acts of his agent.
It is our opinion that a personal judgment may not be entered
against an owner of a lease interest unless such owner is personally
liable under the general law of contracts. 123 This conclusion is extremely
significant when it is considered that in most of the instances where a
mechanics' lien is asserted, the well upon which the benefits have been
conferred by the lien claimant is much more likely to have been aban-
doned as a dry hole than to have been completed as a commercial pro-
ducer of oil or gas. This being the case, the likelihood of a deficiency
judgment following lien foreclosure is much more probable than it is in
those cases where mechanics' liens against general building construction
are foreclosed.
There are numerous cases arising out of the Louisiana courts where
a personal judgment is obtained against a lease interest holder even in
the face of the fact that there was no contractual undertaking on the
part of such lease owner to pay a given debt. One should not be misled
by their results, for in Louisiana a statutory provision requiring lease
owners to bond their contractors has the effect of placing the owner in
the position of a bondsman insofar as those persons who deal with the
contractor are concerned. There is no such statutory liability imposed
in Colorado.
The question of personal liability is particularly significant from
the standpoint of those persons who purchase undivided working inter-
ests in a given lease and the attendant fractional interest in the well to
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be drilled thereon. Quite generally, these persons pay a flat considera-
tion for their interest and for their share of drilling and completing a
given well. In doing so they presume that their liability will be limited
to such amount. There are cases where a personal liability was attached
to such persons on the theory that they were members of a mining part-
nership. 24 But certainly the better view, and the one more widely held,
is to the effect that such persons were not members of a mining partner-
ship during the exploratory phase of the oil and gas operation; and this
view prohibits their personal liability on the debt. One of the best state-
ments of this rule is found in Dunbar v. Olson,12' which reads as follows:
"The owner of a so-called working interest in an oil and gas
lease has a duty to share in the expense in proportion to his
interest, which is consistent with his co-tenancy relationship,
but he does not become a mining partner by virtue of this fact.
(Summers, Oil and Gas, Permanent Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 723,
Page 152). Before a mining partnership exists, it must be
shown, not only that there is a joint ownership of the property,
but also a joint working and a joint operation of the lease
involved, which must be shown by competent evidence."'
125
Following this statement, the Illinois court emphasized that the lien
claimant did not rely upon the credit of any one of the owners of the
lease other than the party with whom he contracted and added this very
significant statement relating to the financial structure of oil and gas
ventures:
"Because of the uncertainty of mining operations, few persons
are willing to risk their means at such an undertaking, ...
interests owned by persons differ in amounts as each is able to
furnish means or is willing to take the risks, and . . . these
interests are constantly being assigned and strangers are being
injected into the ownership, so that it would be unjust to sub-
ject each proprietor to personal liability which might sweep
away all his property in an undertaking created against his con-
sent by those who could become members without his knowl-
edge and against his wishes."
' 25b
It is, of course, possible when the facts so warrant to establish personal
liability on the basis that the person against whom the same is asserted
was a member of a mining partnership and as such is liable jointly and
124 Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854, 3 Oil and Gas
Rep. 1572 (1954).
125 349 Ill. 308, 110 N.E.2d 664, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 321 (1953).
125a 110 N.E.2d at 666.
125b Id. at 666-7.
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severally with his co-partners for a debt incurred in behalf of the part-
nership.126 If the necessary elements for a mining partnership are present,
a careful pleader representing a lien claimant will insure collectibility
of his client's debt by pleading this fact in his lien foreclosure suit and
action on the debt.12 On this point, however, it should be remembered
that under most authorities a mining partnership does not exist during
the exploratory phase of an oil and gas venture,128 and also that a mem-
ber of a mining partnership is not liable for the antecedent debts of the
partnership or of his co-partners.129 There are some recent companion
cases130 arising in Utah which appear contrary to these general concepts;
however, a careful examination of these authorities reveals them to be
doubtful.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Limitations of time and space have made it imperative that many
-very significant problems relating to our subject be deleted from con-
sideration here. Also, to facilitate both its reading and writing, we have
confined the article in most phases to well operations. Generally, how-
ever, we do feel that the theories applied here to such operations are
applicable to the other types of oil and gas operations such as pipelines
which are included within the specific statute.
The reader should continually carry an awareness of the lack of
authority existing in Colorado on the questions considered. Cases from
other jurisdictions, of which there are many, should be approached on
a basis of extreme caution because of the distinguishable character of
the statutes upon which they are based. Further, such statutes have
legislative histories and backgrounds as complicated and as confusing
as our own statutes. Because of these circumstances it has been necessary
at many points in the article, in order to be definitive at all, to reach
,conclusions based largely upon our own analysis of the statutes and of
what we feel to be their underlying intent. Time, and our Supreme
Court, will either vindicate or condemn the results so reached.
126 Lyman v. Schwartz, 13 Colo. App. 318, 57 Pac. 735 (1899).
127 In Hendershott v. Dale Leonard Prospecting Co., 298 Mich. 367, 299 N.W. 110
(1941) the complaint alleged a mining partnership and a joint venture. Joint and
several liability was denied, but only because the facts proved that the claimant
had dealt individually with the defendants on the basis that each would be liable
only for his proportionate share of the claimant's debt.
128 Dunbar v. Olson, 349 Il1. 308, 110 N.E.2d 664, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 321 (1953);
Browne v. Sabine Mach. and Supply Co., 253 S.W.2d 713, 2 Oil and Gas Rep. 268
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Southwestern Leg. Found. 5th Ann. Inst. on Oil and Gas Law
and Taxation, 237-39 (1954); 12 Texas L. Rev. 418 (1934).
129 Elm Oil Co. v. Clark Lumber Co., 179 Okla. 241, 65 P.2d 1221 (1937).
130 See note 124 supra.
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This note will survey the Colorado law of interest and will place
particular emphasis on small loan regulation.' The theory of small loan
regulation' is two-fold. First, the law must protect the individual debtor
so that he will not be subjected to unscrupulous rates of interest,
methods of computation, and methods of collection. Second, the law
must protect the investment of the lender 3 because consumer credit is a
fact and a need of the modern economic society which will be fulfilled.
To fulfill this need by proper and responsible parties, society must
assure the lender an adequate return on his investment so that lending
will be done in compliance with the law and individuals who need this
financing will not be forced to resort to the loan shark.4.
An expert in the field of small loan legislation has said:
I believe it will be conceded by all that the business of making
small loans to workingmen, termed industrial banking, has a
definite place in our system and fills a much felt need. Seem-
ingly the means of ridding the communities of the loan sharks
was to find a suitable substitute. Three substitutes suggested
themselves. First there were the charitable institutions .....
Next there is the cooperative system, such as the credit union.
... Finally, we have the licensed and regulated industrial lender,
whose business is banking, with small loans a specialty and
working men as his clientele.'
Colorado has, in one form or another, all three types of agencies.
1 For excellent symposia discussions of theories of consumer credit and interpre-
tations, applications, and history of small loan legislation see 19 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 1-138 (1954), and 8 Law & Contemp. Prob. 1-204 (1941).
2 For a discussion of large loans affecting loan acquisition financing, construction
financing, and home owner financing in Colorado, see Storke and Sears, Subdivision
Financing, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 549 (1956).
3Notes, An Ounce of Discretion for a Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Reform for
Usury Laws, 65 Yale L. J. 105 (1956).
Redfield, The Responsibility of All Consumer Lending Agencies to Help Eliminate
the Loan Shark Evil, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. 104 (1954).
5Hellerstein, Industrial Banking and Reforms, 6 DICTA 5, 7 (1928).
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This note excludes charitable agencies and focuses attention on the
many statutes of Colorado and the United States which affect the con-
sumer by regulating lending agencies. There are many and various types
of lending agencies which are regulated by separate statutes. These
statutes may be classified: first, general interest statutes-the legal rate
statute, the Colorado Consumer Finance Act, and the 1913 loan law;
second, those which have a direct effect upon consumer financing-the
Retail Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act, state and federal banking
laws including regulations on industrial banks, title and guaranty com-
panies and trust companies, credit union legislation, and pawnbroker
legislation.
I. GENERAL INTEREST STATUTES
Legal Rate Statute
The legal rate of interest in Colorado is 6% per annum.6 This is
material only in regard to interest as an element of damages,7 for the
legal rate of interest is not binding on contracting parties and they may
enforce a stipulation for a higher rate subject only to the limitations
set forth in the statutes to be discussed. Even though the legislature did
not see fit to include in the legal rate statute restrictions on the rate of
interest to be charged, it is not precluded in later years from making
certain interest charges void and criminal.'
Colorado Consumer Finance Act
Scope
This statute expressly repealed the Colorado Small Loan Act of
1943 0 and made the 1913 Loan Law" applicable only to loans in excess
of $1500.12 The essence of the Colorado Consumer Finance Act is that
any person may charge, whether for interest, compensation, considera-
tion or expense, an aggregate rate not greater than 12% per annum
whether the loan is secured or not." One who desires to engage in the
business of making loans of $1,500 or less, whether secured or unsecured,
and to charge more than 12% per annum, must obtain a license from
the state bank commissioner. 4 The act does not apply to any (a) bank,
trust company, savings bank, industrial bank, savings and loan associa-
tion, credit union, or pawnbroker, (b) bona fide commercial loan made
to a dealer upon the security of personal property held for resale, or (c)
bona fide obligations for goods or services when such obligations are
payable directly to the person who provided the goods or services."
This exception in favor of the named agencies should not deny
equal protection of the laws and should not constitute class or special
legislation. 16 The exemption of commercial loans and obligations in-
curred for goods and services embodies Colorado case law to the effect
that there may be any spread between cash price and installment price
in credit sales.'"
6 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-1-1 (1953).
7 See Id. § 41-2-1 and 73-1-2. See Magill, Interest as Damages in Colorado, 28
DICTA 285 (1951); 16 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 162 (1944).
8 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-1-3 (1953).
9 Waddell v. Traylor, 99 Colo. 576, 64 P.2d 1273 (1937).
10 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 73, art. 2 (1953).
11 Id. c. 73, art. 3.
12 Id § 73-4-19(1) (Supp. 1955).
13 Id. § 73-4-3(l).
14 Ibid.
15 Id. § 73-4-3(2).
16 Waddell v. Traylor, 99 Colo. 576, 64 P.2d 1273 (1937).
'7 Daniels v. Fenton, 97 Colo. 409, 50 P.2d 62 (1935); Gilbert v. Hudgens, 92 Colo.
571, 22 P.2d 858 (1933).
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In the leading Colorado case, X bought a used automobile from Z
at an agreed purchase price of $351, upon which X made a down pay-
ment of $47, leaving a balance due Z of $304 secured by a chattel mort-
gage on the automobile. The chattel mortgage included a further charge
of $36 which, if construed as interest, would have exceeded the interest
rate then in effect. The Colorado Supreme Court held that parties are
entitled, irrespective of usury statutes, to make such "spread" as they
may agree upon between cash and credit price, and the percentage of
that spread is immaterial. "The rule that a sale of goods on credit does
not come within the prohibition of usury statutes, because such sale
does not involve the loan or forbearance of money or credit, is of uni-
versal application."' Is
Rates for Licensees
The following are the maximum rates of interest which can be
charged by a licensee on portions of a loan: 9
$000.01 to $ 300.00 ------------------------ 3 per month
300.01 to 500.00 .------------------------ 2 per month
500.01 to 1,500.00 ........... 1% per month
Discounting, as between lender and borrower, is prohibited. 20 The
new law gives the lender an option of either computing the above charges
upon the unpaid balance or computing by precalculating the aggregate
of the charges and adding them to the loan, then dividing the total into
equal monthly installments. 2 The difference in the methods of compu-
tation is illustrated in the footnotes.22
The statute prohibits compounding interest if computation and
collection are made on a per cent per month basis.2" If computation is
made by aggregating the total, (1) in case of prepayment in full, all
charges in excess of what would have been paid on the per cent per
month basis are to be credited to the debtor's account, (2) the licensee
may charge 2o per month, computed on a daily basis, for arrearages,
this charge to be refunded in case of prepayment in full of the contract,
and (3) the contract is accelerated, charges in excess of what would have
been charged under the per cent per month basis are to be credited to
the amount due .
2
18 Daniels v. Fenton, supra note 17 at 411, 50 P.2d at 63.
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-4-14(1)(Supp. 1955).
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 There is no Colorado case interpreting the two statuory methods of computation.
It may be urged that the wording of the statute permits two methods of computation
illustrated in the following tables. The Colorado State Bank Commissioner and Louis
A. Hellerstein are of the opinion that only an amortized schedule illustrated by the
first table is permissible. The assumed amount of loan is $300.00.
23 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-4-14(2) (Supp. 1955).
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TABLE I
Total Pd on Pd on Outstdg Int on Money
Date Pd Int Prin Balance in Use
2-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 270.00 3% per month
3-1-57 39.00 8.10 30.90 239.10 3% per month
4-1-57 39.00 7.17 31.83 207.27 3% per month
5-1-57 39.00 6.22 32.78 174.79 3% per month
6-1-57 39.00 5.24 33.76 140.73 3% per month
7-1-57 39.00 4.22 34.78 105.95 3% per month
8-1-57 39.00 3.18 35.82 70.77 3% per month
9-1-57 39.00 2.12 36.88 33.89 3% per month
10-1-57 34.91 1.02 33.89 3% per month
TABLE II
Total Pd on Pd on Outstdg Int on Money
Date Pd Int Prin Balance in Use
2-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 270.00 3% per month
3-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 240.00 3%% per month
4-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 210.00 3 /% per month
5-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 180.00 4.23% per month
6-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 150.00 5% per month
7-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 120.00 6% per month
8-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 90.00 7 % % per month
9-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 60.00 10% per month
10-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 30.00 15% per month
11-1-57 39.00 9.00 30.00 -- 30% per month
Under the statute the following "extras" and no others may be
included with the principal 25 to determine the amount of the loan upon
which the interest is based: (1) specified types of insurance,2 6 (2) lawful
fees, without limit, for filing or noting a motor vehicle lien upon a cer-
tificate of title, releasing or recording any instrument securing the loan,
or releasing an existing lien, 27 and (3) the amount required to retire an
existing loan.28
Penalties
Although under the repealed statute,29 if the rates were excessive, the
lender lost all right to principal, interest, and any other charges, under
the present statute such a contract is not void. However it is enforceable
only as "to the amount advanced thereunder."30 The statute specifically
states that insurance premiums shall be included in "the amount ad-
vanced thereunder," 31 but it is questionable whether or not "the amount
advanced thereunder" includes the amount required to retire an existing
loan and the lawful charges referred to above. The state bank commis-
sioner may revoke the lender's license if rates are excessive. 2
Making a loan contrary to the licensing section of the statute con-
stitutes a misdemeanor and subjects the lending participants to possible
fines of $25 to $500.13 Further, the loan is void and the lender loses all
right to principal, interest, or any charges whatever.34
The statute also prohibits false or . misleading advertising with
regard to the charges for or terms of loans"5 imposing the sanction of
possible license revocation.36
25 Id. § 73-4-2.
26 Ibid. and § 73-4-14(8).
27 Id. §§ 73-4-2 and 14(4).
28 Id. § 73-4-2.
29 Id. § 73-2-20 (1953J.
30 Id. § 73-4-14(7) (Supp. 1955).
31 Ibid.
32 Id. § 73-4-8(1)(b).
33 Id. § 73-4-3(3).
34 Ibid.
35 Id. § 73-4-12.




The portion of the 1913 loan law still in effect dictates that anyone
may lend more than $1,500 so long as the aggregate of interest, discount,
and consideration is not more than 12% per annum. 7 And if the loan
exceeds $1,500 there is no statutory maximum rate of interest and no
requirement for licensing so long as no security8 of any kind is required.39
But if one desires to engage in the business of making loans for a greater
rate of return than 12% per annum, he must obtain a license from the
state bank commissioner.
40
Like the Colorado Consumer Finance Act, the 1913 loan law ex-
pressly exempts national banks, state banks, trust companies, banks
operating under state charters or supervision, savings and loan associa-
tions, and title and guaranty companies.4 These exemptions should not
constitute class or special legislation or deny equal protection of the
laws.
42
Discounting, as between lender and borrower, is prohibited.4 3 Inter-
est allowable to a licensee is 2% per month.44 Computation under this
statute must be based upon the unpaid balance. 45 This maximum rate
covers "all expenses, demands, and services of every character, including
notarial and recording fees and charges, except upon the foreclosure of
the security.' '46
Penalties
If a licensee charges more than 2% per month, he may have his
license revoked,47 may be liable for treble the amount of the over-charge
and costs of suit,48 and may be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of $25 to $300 and/or imprisonment in the county jail from five to
thirty days.4" If a non-licensee charges more than his maximum the same
penalties apply except, of course, he has no license to revoke.50
Summary of General Interest Statutes
The general interest statutes of Colorado permit, on a loan not
exceeding $1,500, a licensee's maximum rate of interest of 3% per
month on the first $300, 11,2% per month on the next $200, and 1% per
month on the remainder. On a loan exceeding $1,500, a licensee's maxi-
mum rate of interest is 2% per month. In the case of a non-licensee the
maximum rate of interest on any loan is 1% per month, provided that
if the loan exceeds $1,500 and there is no security given, the lender is
subject to no maximum rate of interest.
37 Id. § 73-3-1 (1953).
38 The unusual case Reagan v. District of Columbia, 41 App. D. C. 409 (1914) held
that the promissory note itself was a "security" under a federal statute similar to
the Colorado statute under examination.
39 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-3-1 (1953).
40 Ibid.
41 Id. § 73-3-10.
42 Waddell v. Traylor, 99 Colo. 576, 64 P.2d 1273 (1937).




47 Id. § 73-3-6.
48 Id. § 73-3-7. It is questionable whether the one year statute of limitations men-
tioned in this section affects both treble damages and costs of suit.
49 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ana). § 73-3-9 (1953).
50 See notes 48 and 49 supra.
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1I. SPECIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND PROBLEMS OF GENERAL
COLORADO INTEREST STATUTES
Right to Principal of a Usurious Loan Contract
It would seem that the 1913 Loan Law and the Colorado Consumer
Finance Act imply that usurious loan contracts offend public policy.
It therefore seems that, should one enter a usurious contract, the entire
loan should be void and the lender should have no right to either the
principal or the interest. Such is not the Colorado law, as it is stated in
Waddell v. Traylor:51
Since the act (1913 Loan Law) does not in express terms make a
note void when the consideration charged for the use of the
money is in excess of that therein specified as lawful, but pro-
vides that only charges in excess of those specified shall consti-
tute a misdemeanor, and fixes the punishment therefor; pro-
viding further that treble the interest paid may be recovered,
we hold that other penalties are thereby excluded and that
there may be a recovery of the money actually loaned with
such consideration for its use as might lawfully have been con-
tracted for under the act.
The rule of this case not only allows recovery of the principal but
goes further and allows the lender to recover the interest for which he
could have legally contracted. However, a later Colorado case52 allowed
recovery of the principal but did not allow the lender to recover the
interest for which he could have legally contracted.
(W) e hold that Waggener (borrower) is entitled to have judg-
ment entered in .his favor for treble the amount by him paid as
excess interest, and that such payment be credited on his note
and deed of trust, and that upon payment by him of the bal-
ance remaining due, he have a release of the deed of trust.5
We have already seen that the Colorado Consumer Finance Act
leaves no doubt of the fact that the "amount advanced thereunder" is
collectible in usurious loan contracts together with advances for insur-
ance premiums. 4 Under the theory of Waddell v. Traylor,55 the rate of
interest allowable by the act should not be recoverable by the lender
because the act expressly lists what is recoverable by the lender in a
usurious loan contract.
Persons Subject to Usury Statutes
The Colorado Consumer Finance Act 6 and the 1913 Loan Laws7
refer to "those engaged in the business of loaning money." The question
arises whether the usury laws apply only to those whose occupation is
lending money or if everyone is subject to the usury laws no matter how
seldom he might lend money. A leading Colorado case58 has held that a
prior statute prohibited usury even by one whose occupation is not
lending money. This result, it is submitted, would obtain today. The
statutes state, "No person shall charge or receive a greater rate of inter-
est than two per cent per month . . ."59 and, "Every Person . . . may
51 99 Colo. 576, 582, 64 P.2d 1273, 1276 (1937).
52 Waggener v. Motor Co., 130 Colo. 294, 274 P.2d 968 (1954).
53 Id. at 301, 274 P.2d at 972 (parenthetical matter added).
54 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-4-14(7) (Supp. 1955).
55 Waddell v. Traylor, 99 Colo. 576, 64 P.2d 1273 (1937).
56 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-4-3(1) (Supp. 1955).
57 Id. § 73-3-1 (1953).
58 Rice v. Franklin Loan and Finance Co., 82 Colo. 163, 258 Pa.. 223 (1927).
55 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-3-5 (1953) (emphasis supplied).
DICTA
DICTA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1957
recover treble damages ... against the person who shall have received
." excessive interest,60 and, "No further or other amount whatsoever
shall be directly or indirectly charged . . ."'
Factors Which Determine the Amount of Loan
It is important to determine the amount of the loan, first, to see
which statute controls; second, to determine upon what base the interest
charges are computed if the loan is governed by the 1913 statute; and
third, to determine whether the penalty provisions of the interest stat-
utes apply. The Colorado Consumer Finance Act specifically defines
the base upon which the interest rate is applied as follows: " 'Amount of
loan' or 'loan' shall mean the amount of money advanced to or for and
upon behalf of borrower including the amount required to retire an
existing loan, insurance premiums and costs incurred . . ."62 The costs
incurred are the lawful fees paid by the licensee to a licensed abstract
company or public officer for filing, noting a motor vehicle lien upon a
certificate of title, releasing or recording an instrument securing the
loan or releasing a lien.63
60 Id. § 73-3-7 (emphasis supplied).
61 Id. § 73-4-14(7) (Supp. 1955)(emphasis supplied).
62 Id. § 73-4-2.
6 Id. I 73-4-14(4).
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Unfortunately, the 1913 Loan Law is not as specific as the Colorado
Consumer Finance Act in this regard. The 1913 law provides, "this
charge (2% per month) shall cover all expenses, demands, and services
of every character, including notarial and recording fees and charges,
except upon the foreclosure of the security.""4 This language restricts
the rate of interest but does not define the base upon which the rate is
to be applied. It is clear from the cases that the base may not include"service fees."65
Meaning of "Value Delivered"
The 1913 Loan Laws grants "treble the amount of money so paid
or value delivered above the rate aforesaid (2%/ per month)."" Does
the note and deed of trust given to secure a loan constitute the "value
delivered"? Two recent Colorado decisions squarely conflict on this
issue. Waggener v. Motor Co. stated, "The value or thing of value deliv-
ered in the instant case was the note and deed of trust which secured
it."167 However, Horlbeck v. Walther declared, "We hold that the note
and trust deed received by the lenders did not constitute the 'value'
received by them under the statute, for these were merely evidence of a
promise to pay and a lien to secure the same."68 Determining what con-
stitutes the "value delivered" is crucial if it is assumed that no payments
are in fact made on a usurious contract. Under the reasoning of the
Waggener case, a lender is liable for treble damages notwithstanding
the fact that no payments are made by the borrower if a note and deed
of trust are delivered.
The court in the Waggener case was faced with the question whether
a lender who was not licensed when the contract was entered, making
2%/0 per month usurious, and was licensed when the loan was partially
paid, making 2%, per month not usurious, will be subject to the penalty
section of the 1913 Loan Law. The court stated, "Defendant in error
not having procured the license at the time the loan was made, violated
the Act and made a charge which by the terms of the Act was unlawful.
The subsequent issuance of the license could not make lawful that
which on the date of the loan was unlawful."6 9 This case might be inter-
preted to mean that the penalty provision is ex contractu and not
ex delicto and therefore the penalty would arise upon formation of the
contract and not upon payment of the overcharge. Such a theory, how-
ever, is inconsistent with prior case law. In Siebers v. Disque7 0 X loaned
money to Z and the interest to be later paid was usurious under the then
existing statute. The statute was repealed before any interest payments
were made. However, a saving clause in the repealing act provided
that the repeal should not modify any penalty "which shall have been
incurred" under the repealed statute. The issue was whether the debtor
could recover the penalty even though his payments were not made
until after enactment of the repealing statute. The court held that the
64 Id. § 73-3-5 (1953).
65 Personal Finance Co. v. Day, 126 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1942); Finance Co. v. Baker,
105 Colo. 1, 94 P.2d 460 (1939); Angleton v. Franklin Finance Co., 88 Colo. 322, 295
Pac. 797 (1931); Beneficial Loan and Investment Co. v. Ira, 75 Colo. 379, 226 Pac. 136
<1924).
66 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-3-7 (1953).
67 130 Colo. 294, 300, 274 P.2d 968, 971 (1954).
68 133 Colo. 19, 26, 291 P.2d 688, 692 (1956).
69 Waggener v. Motor Co., 130 Colo. 294, 299, 274 P.2d 968, 971 (1954).
70 102 Colo. 39, 76 P.2d 1108 (1938).
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penalty was not incurred unless some payment was made at a. time when
the contract was usurious.
Is the "value delivered" determined by the foreclosure price, or is
it determined by the market value of that foreclosed upon if the debtor
defaults upon the note and the creditor forecloses upon the security?
Horlbeck v. Walther"1 evidently applies the former as the test, holding
that where no redemption of the property followed the trustee's sale,
and the trustee's deed was issued to the lenders, the lenders were not sub-
jected to treble damages for the market value of the property in excess
of the sum bid on foreclosure.
Miscellaneous
Colorado has not yet decided whether the defense of usury will be
applied against a holder in due course 72 nor has it decided whether,
if a note is discounted, and if the rate of discount considered as interest
would be usurious, that transaction would be usurious.1
3
III. STATUTES DEALING WITH SPECIFIC BUSINESS ENTITIES
Wagebrokers
Although a wage assignment as security is prohibited under the
present statute, 74 the statute does allow such an assignment as considera-
tion for a loan of money.
75
Wagebrokers in Denver are in a precarious position. According to
a city ordinance,76 a wagebroker may charge no more than 2% per
month on the amount actually advanced. However, under the state
statute,77 the maximum rate is not a flat per cent per month but is 30/,
1V1/%, or 1% per month, according to the amount loaned. Yet a wage-
broker must be licensed with both the state and the City and County of
Denver. Query: If a wagebroker charges a rate of interest consistent
with the city ordinance, will he be violating the state statute and thus
be subject to all state penalties? In Ray v. Denver,78 a Denver city ordi-
nance specified a lower rate of interest than was allowable under an
existing statute. The court held the city ordinance invalid, saying that
the case fell within the fundamental principle that an ordinance which
is in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide appli-
cation is invalid. The court rejected the application in this situation
of the principle that a municipality may exact requirements additional
to the regulations of the state because the court found a "conflict" with
existing state statute. It is submitted that the present Denver wagebroker
ordinance conflicts with the state statute and is, therefore, invalid.
Pawnbrokers
A "pawnbroker" is defined as one who loans money on personal
property and charges as much as 3% per month.79 He must be licensed
by the proper authorities of the town or city in which he operates. 80
71 133 Colo. 19, 291 P.2d 688 (1956); But see Camellia v. Siegal, 131 Colo. 570, 283
P.2d 1083 (1955) (court allowed debtor to show fair market value of the property which
was turned over to the secured creditor after default in a case where there was no
foreclosure sale).
72 Compare Nuckols v. Bank of California, 10 Cal. 2d 278, 74 P.2d 271 (1938) with
Hall v. Mortgage Security Corp., 119 W. Va. 140, 192 S.E. 145 (1937).
73 See HELLERSTEIN, CHATTEL MORTGAGES IN COLORADO, 113 (1956).
"Renewal" of the balance of the purchase price note does come within the statute.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-4-3(2) (Supp. 1955).
74 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-4-17 (Supp. 1955).
7- Id. § 73-4-16.
76 Denver Rev. Munic. Code § 963.5 (1950).
77 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 73-4-16 (Supp. 1955).
78 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942).
79 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 139-58-16 (1953).
80 Id. § 139-58-1.
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If a "pawnbroker" operates without a license he may be guilty of a
misdemeanor and if convicted not only does he forfeit the loan but also
may be liable to imprisonment and/or fine."'
The maximum rate of interest is 3% per month on the money
actually advanced.8 2 If a pawnbroker charges more than the statutory
rate, he is subject to a fine of one hundred dollars for each offense.
8 3
There is no express provision depriving the pawnbroker of his right to
the money actually advanced pursuant to a usurious contract nor de-
priving him of the right to the usurious interest charged.
A pawnbroker licensed in Denver, like a wagebroker, is in a pre-
carious position. The Denver ordinance8 permits a pawnbroker to
charge a higher rate of interest than does the state statute. Under the
doctrine of Ray v. Denver,85 the city ordinance is probably invalid;
therefore, if a pawnbroker charges the maximum rate allowed by the
city, he will nevertheless be violating the state statute.
Credit Unions
It is interesting to note again 8 an observation made in 1928 on
types of lending agencies and theories to rid the community of loan
sharks. The prediction regarding credit unions has been given effect.
The chart below8 7 concerns itself only with state chartered credit unions.
Year No. of Charters Outstanding Loans Total Assets
1950 72 $ 6,314,791.00 $ 8,030,130.00
1951 75 6,736,918.00 9,753,245.00
1952 83 10,009,005.00 12,541,434.00
1953 95 13,043,035.00 15,671,215.00
1954 105 16,317,221.00 20,038,202.00
1955 114 20,600,356.00 24,563,027.00
1956 121 24,375,086.00 29,289,828.00
Credit unions are organized under state 8 or federal 8 statutes. Al-
though a federal credit union may make loans payable within a time
period not to exceed three years,9 there is no such statutory time limit
81 Id. § 139-58-16.
82 Id. § 139-58-8.
83 Ibid. The fine Is payable one-half to the informer and one-half to the school fund
of the county where the fine is collected. Id. § 139-58-17.
84 Denver Rev. Munic. Code § 952.15 (1950).
85 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942).
86 Hellerstein, Industrial Banking and Reforms, 6 DICTA 5, 7 (1928).
87 Statement of Condition of State Chartered Credit Unions, compiled by the Colo-
rado Bank Commissioner (unpublished annual report).
88 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 38, art. 1 (1953).
89 48 Stat. 1216 (1934), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1752-67 (1952).




for the state credit union. Both types are limited to a maximum rate of
interest not to exceed one per cent per month on the unpaid balance."
The one per cent per month interest rate includes all charges incident
to making the loan9 2 except that in the state regulated credit union there
is a twenty-five cent entrance fee.
93
If a federally chartered credit union charges excessive interest, not
only may it suffer revocation of its charter,94 but it may also suffer a
forfeiture of the entire amount of interest contracted.95 Further, if the
greater rate of interest has been paid, it is recoverable in an action in
the nature of debt, subject to a two year statute of limitations.9 6 If a
state chartered credit union charges excessive interest, the only express
statutory penalty is revocation of the certificate of approval by the state
bank commissioner.
97
Typically, a state credit union is composed of members of a com-
mon economic group, although some Colorado communities9 have
organized municipal credit union associations pursuant to federal
statute.'00
Retail Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act'01
This statute governs agreements to purchase or to lease a motor
vehicle where the vendee or lessee pays as compensation for its use a
sum substantially equivalent to its value and the lessee is bound to be-
come, or has the option of becoming, the owner of the motor vehicle.'
02
With certain stated exceptions, one engaged in the business of acquir-
ing such contracts must be licensed by the state bank commissioner.
1 3
The amount that the purchaser owes the dealer is determined by sub-
tracting the down payment from the cash price of the automobile and
adding to the difference the insurance cost and the "time price differen-
tial."'0 4 The statute provides for prepayment in full and credits there-
for.
105
The "time price differential" is that sum of money which the pur-
chaser obligates himself to pay for the privilege of purchasing the car
on installments rather than for cash.10 6 The time price differential is
not interest and is not subject to Colorado interest law regulations. The
statute specifically permits any amount of time price differential.'07 Such
a statutory provision embodies Colorado case law that to be subject to
usury law, there must be a loan or forbearance of money or credit and
since, in the sale of real or personal property, there is no such loan or
forbearance the amount of the spread is immaterial.
00
91 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-14 (1953); 48 Stat. 1218 (1934), 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5)
(1952).
92 Ibid.
03 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-12 (1953).
94 48 Stat. 1221 (1934). 12 U.S.C. § 1766(b)(1) (1952).
95 48 Stat. 1218 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5) (1952).
96 Ibid.
97 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-6 (1953).
98 Rye and Center, Colorado, have "quasi-municipal" state regulated credit unions.
99 Akron, East Prowers, Haxton, Holyoke, Hotchkiss, Peetz, Ray, Rocky Ford,
Sugar City, Swink, Stratton, Telluride, and Yuma.
10 48 Stat. 1219 (1934), 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (1952).
01 See Hellerstein, The Retail Motor Vehicle Installment Sales Act, 28 DICTA 229
(1951).
102 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-16-1(2) (1953).
103 Id. § 13-16-2(1).
104 Id. § 13-16-6(2), as amended, Colo. Iaws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 85.
105 Id. § 13-16-7.
106 Id. § 13-16-1(8).
107 Ibid.
108 Daniels v. Fenton, 97 Colo. 409, 50 P.2d 62 (1935); Gilbert v. Hudgens, 92 Colo.
571, 22 P.2d 858 (1933).
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The writer submits that the statute regulating installment sales of
automobiles should be amended to provide that the amount of the time
p rice differential be construed as interest subject to Colorado's usury
aws.19 In the sale of automobiles it seems unjustifiable to distinguish
spread from interest; to the purchaser the result is the same. If automo-
bile dealers desire to sell cars, let them do so; if automobile dealers
desire to enter the consumer finance market, let them do so. However,
if they choose to enter the finance market, let them be subject to the
same regulations as others in the same business.
It is imperative for the attorney to realize that the statute sets forth
many strict conditions precedent to the validity of automobile install-
ment sales contracts."' A holder of the installment contract may suffer
revocation of his sales finance license"' and may lose his right to the
time price differential or any other charges if contract requirements or
prepayment requirements are knowingly violated and there is a retention
of profits. 12 One who violates the license requirements may be guilty of
a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine not to exceed $500."1
Banks, Savings and Loan Associations, and Trust Companies
Industrial banks are limited to a 10% per annum rate of inter-
est." 4 The statute permits discounting or permits parties to agree to
payments based either upon the unpaid balance or upon aggregating
the total interest and principal and dividing that total by equal monthly
payments."' The statute appears to be ambiguous 1 6 as to whether inter-
est must be based on the unpaid balance if payments are to be made in
installments.
The loan or base upon which the rate is computed includes any
amount paid to retire an existing loan, insurance premiums, filing and
recording fees, the amount advanced, examination and investigation
fees paid to public officials, fees for executing necessary instruments,
fees incurred by satisfying a judgment or encumbrance on the security
to the contract, abstract fees, reasonable attorney's fees, and taxes.1
7 It
appears that although the statute with the right hand gives protection
to the borrower by allowing a maximum rate of 10% per annum, with
the left hand it gives the investor a "fair" return on his investment by
allowing the "amount of loan" to be padded to an extent and by allow-
ing a method of computing interest supposedly not allowed by the
Colorado Consumer Finance Act or by the 1913 Loan Law.
If an excessive rate of interest has been charged, all interest charges
on the loan are uncollectible, but the principal is collectible." 8 Pro-
vision is made for prepayment in full."9
State banks are governed neither by the 1913 Loan Law 20 nor by
the Colorado Consumer Finance Act.' 2 ' Indeed, there is no maximum
109 H.B. 161 after passing both houses was vetoed by Governor McNichols March
28, 1957. This bill sought to limit the amount of time price differential to a rate per
$100 per annum based on the age of the automobile sold or leased.
HIe Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-16-6 (1953).
111 Id. § 13-16-3(1)(b).
112 Id. § 13-16-9(2).
113 Id. § 13-16-9(1).
114 Id. § 14-7-7(6)(a) (Supp. 1955).
115 Id. § 14-7-7(6)(c).
116 Id. § 14-7-7(6)ka) implies that the computation must be based on an amortiza-
tion system. But see § 14-7-7(6)(c).
117 Id. § 14-7-7(6)(d).
118 Id. § 14-7-7(9) (1953).
119 Id. § 14-7-7(7) (Supp. 1955).
120 Id. § 73-3-10 (1953).
121 Id. § 73-4-3(2) (Supp. 1955).
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rate of interest which a state bank may charge. However, because of
(1) the relatively large size of state bank loans and (2) the banking
practice of securing loans with conservative collateral, the small pro-
portion of the cost of paper work to the amount loaned reduces the
cost of making the loan. This lower cost of making the loan enables a
state bank to make the same profit as a consumer finance agency while
charging a smaller rate of interest.
Federal banks located in Colorado are subject to no maximum rate
of interest. This is true because a federal statute1 2 allows a federal bank
to charge the same rate of interest as that allowed state banks by the
laws of the state where the bank is located. Since Colorado state banks
are subject to no interest maximum, federally chartered banks are also
unrestricted and therefore the penalty12 3 for charging usurious interest
has no effect.
State savings and loan associations are subject to no usury statute.
The authorizing statute specifies, "Any savings and loan association may
charge, contract for and recover such rate of interest as may be provided
in the notes or other evidences of indebtedness ... No interest that may
accrue to an association shall be deemed usurious . . .124
State trust companies are subject to no maximum rate of interest
because the statute'12 makes their rate of interest the same as that im-
posed on state banks.
IV. CONCLUSION
This survey of the Colorado law of interest has shown that various
lending agencies are governed by various statutes, various rates of inter-
est, various penalties, various methods of computing interest, and various
methods of determining the base upon which the interest is computed.
It has been shown that reference to special statutes is imperative because
there is no one statute which is the exclusive repository of Colorado
interest law.
122 Rev. Stat. § 5197 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1952).
123 Rev. Stat. § 5198 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1952).
124 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 122-2-15 (1953).
125 Id. § 14-6-15.
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OWNERSHIP AND TAXATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
MAURICE C. MACKEY, JR.
Maurice C. Mackey, Jr. is a 1st Lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force, assigned to the faculty of the
Air Force Academy as an Associate Professor of Economics. He has A.B. and M.A. degrees in
Economics from the University of Alabama and a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois. Lt. Mackey
is a student in the University of Denver College of Law, attending class in his off-duty time.
The natural wealth and resources of any state are its means of
subsistence and these resources provide the foundation for whatever
standard of living and technology it may be possible for the citizens of
that state to achieve. Inherent in the sovereignty of the people is the
right freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources.
The law of resource ownership, with particular reference to the
ownership of minerals, is quite different under a common law system
from what it is in most civil law.jurisdictions. Some knowledge of the
different legal theories is helpful in a consideration of policy questions
involving the distribution of the wealth which natural resources provide.
There are actually three theories of mineral ownership in the Civil
Law, (1) res nullius, (2) regalia or royalty, and (3) accession.' The
res nullius system postulates that ownership of the surface of the earth
(toes not carry with it proprietary interest in minerals which may be
contained in the subsoil. Instead, minerals are said to belong to no one
until they have been either developed or reduced to possession. Under
various theories, ownership may be acquired by the first occupant who
exploits the mineral and perfects his right or by the discoverer. Normally
under the res nullius system the role of the state is very limited, usually
amounting to little more than maintaining a system of registry, but
there are some instances in which the state obtains a certain percentage
of the mineral property from the time of its discovery or reduction to
possession.
The regalia or royalty system has as its basis a fundamental
distinction between ownership of surface and subsoil. Individual owner-
ship of the surface is possible, but ownership of minerals which are
contained in the subsoil is attached to the state. The nature of the
state's ownership of these minerals differs among jurisdictions. In some
civil law systems the state has absolute ownership of minerals, and holds
its interest either as a juridical person or as a representative of the col-
lective body. This is called the dominial theory. Under a different theory,
ownership is attributed to the collective body, and the state has power
to regulate the use of minerals through concessions or grants and, as
sovereign, receives a share of the product which is obtained from the
exploitation. However the regalia system is defined, it represents a sys-
tem where the state's control over subsoil resources is so complete as to
approximate a relation normally associated with ownership.
Today most Latin American countries have incorporated some form
of the dominial system into their laws. The constitutions of the coun-
tries usually contain a provision that all minerals or certain types of
minerals belong to the state, and that everything related thereto is con-
I Campbell, Principles of Mineral Ownership in the Civil Law and Common Law
Systems, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 303 (1957).
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sidered a public utility. Mineral exploitation is under concessions
granted by the state for a limited time, and intervention by the state
to prevent waste is justified on the basis of the protection of state
property.
The accession theory prevailed in the early Roman Law.2 Accord-
ing to this theory, ownership of surface property embodied ownership
of all resources contained in the subsoil as well as the freedom to exploit
them. The functions of the state were limited to administrative matters
or the exploitation of any lands which the state owned in a proprietary
sense. Later the rights of the state were conceived of as including such
things as the right to police or control the exploitation of resources.
The maximum rights of the state in Roman Law were expressed in
the code of Theodosius, 438 A.D. Under the Theodosian Code, the
state received as a tribute one tenth of all the minerals which were
exploited, and had the right to insist that the production of the exploi-
tation be sold, with preference given to the state in the sale. The land-
owner's rights were recognized, but the state had a right to intervene
in the public interest.
3
The Roman conception of property began with occupation and
possession, which gave one title and the right of conveyance.4 The legal
rationale behind this conception seems to have been the feeling that
everything should have an owner and the occupant could therefore be
presumed to have a better right to proprietorship than anyone else.
In many early societies land was considered as folk-land (a Teu-
tonic concept, not Roman), belonging to the family, community, or
state.5 Such land was not subject to inheritance or partition, but could
be used only for the general good. The Roman Military Commanders
along the Rhine and Danube frontiers adopted this system. Later the
Frankish and Teutonic invaders modified the system into feudal tenure.
Prior to the conquest of England by William of Normandy in 1066,
the Saxons had used the old German folk-land theory, but William
succeeded in imposing the feudal system on England during his reign.
Although the ancient Germanic law had been well established in
England prior to the conquest, it was almost completely replaced in
English law by the Roman concepts of property ownership based on the
theory of accession. In the early seventeenth century Sir Edward Coke
oversimplified the concept with his use of the Latin maxim, cujus est
solum ejus est usque coelum et ad inferros, which means he who owns
the surface soil owns up to the sky above it and to the center of the
earth beneath it.' The individualistic philosophers and legal scholars
of the 17th and 18th centuries such as Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone
adopted the highly individualized Roman law because it suited their
theories, not because it was historically well founded. 7
The law in the United States is basically the same as the English
common law so that the surface owner also owns all subsoil mineral
deposits, whether solid, oil, or gas. Minerals can be owned and conveyed
separately from the general title, however. 8
2 Mackenzie, Roman Law 170 (6th ed. 1886).
:" Campbell, supra note 1, at 308.
4 Maine, Ancient Law 269 (10th ed., notes hy Sir Frederick Pollock. 1906).
5 Id. at 318.
6 Summers, Oil and Gas 26 (1954).
7 Maine, op. cit. supra at 314.
S 2 American Law of Property 508-509 (Casner ed. 1952).
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The regalia theory prevailed in early Spanish law, and according
to legislation, the King received one tenth of the product of all mines
found on private lands and two tenths from mines found on the King's
land. By the ;ixteenth century, under the stimulation of mineral dis-
coveries in Spain's colonies in the New World, the Spanish crown had
succeeded in appropriating ownership of all the metallic mineral de-
posits in the realmY The colonies did not produce all that had been
expected of them, though, and in order to encourage discovery, the
right of exploration and exploitation was given to private individuals.
The crown did retain the right of supervision, however, and received
one-tenth of the production.
The English, in their exploitation of colonized territories, also had
some experience with the reservation of a portion of mineral resources
to the sovereign.'0 Both Queen Elizabeth and Charles I granted patents
to territory in the new world on the condition that a certain percentage
of all the precious metals that might be mined in the territory colonized
be returned to the sovereign.1
The adoption by America's founding fathers of the Roman abso-
lutism was not complete, and some of the exceptions indicate a realistic
understanding of the public interest in natural resources. It is likely
that knowledge of the mineral reservations to the Spanish and English
sovereigns had some influence in the early American policies. The Ordi-
9 Campbell, supra note 1, at 309.
10 36 Am. Jur. 6, Mines and Minerals § (1952).
11 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 307 (1893).
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nance of 1785 helped provide a framework for federal ownership of
mineral wealth in the Northwest Territory. One provision of the ordi-
nance was that the federal surveyors should note on their plat books
all mines, salt-springs, salt-licks, and mill-seats which came'to their atten-
tion while they were running township and section lines. A second pro-
vision was that one-third of all gold, silver, lead and copper mines was
to be reserved for sale or other disposal as Congress might thereafter
direct. 12 This provided a system of ownership of mineral wealth in the
Northwest Territory which was quite different from the system estab-
lished for ordinary farm land. Land which was suited for agriculture
was to be sold for settlement as quickly as possible, but land containing
mineral ores was reserved for sale. There were two objectives behind
enactment of the 1785 ordinance; one was to insure an ample supply
of lead, a vital war material, and the other was to prevent the rise of
monopoly as a result of private ownership of the mineral resources.
Following the Louisiana purchase in 1803, it became necessary for
Congress to enact further legislation regarding the public ownership
established in 1785. There were mines which were being worked before
the United States acquired the territory, and the miners were mining
lead and treating it as private property in violation of .federal law.
In 1807 Congress passed a leasing law' 3 that omitted all reference to
minerals other than lead, but which reserved all lead mines for the
future disposal of the federal government. Congress apparently felt that
the system which it chose for controlling the exploitation of lead
resources-that of granting short term leases not to exceed five years-
would provide the best method of review for insuring that resource
utilization was consistent with public interest. Such a system made it
possible to encourage private development, and at the same time con-
trol the growth of private monopoly.
For a variety of reasons, but primarily because of the nature of the
frontier, there was never adequate administration of the federal law.
Evasion was rampant, and pressure for repeal was continually exerted
on Congress by mining interests, their major contention being that
mineral lands should be treated the same as agricultural lands. Congress
yielded to the pressures, and by the middle of the nineteenth century
had sold the federal lead lands, much of the land going to the states,
the states thereby being in a position to convey the land in fee to pri-
vate interests.
4
It is interesting to note the results of a movement that began in
one state, Wisconsin, during the early part of the 20th century. Efforts
to bring certain parts of the mineral wealth of the state back under
state control led to the enactment in 1911 of a provision that:
Every contract, certificate of sale, or grant . . . of public lands
shall be subject to the continued ownership by the state . . . of
all minerals in said lands, and all mining rights therein.' 5
12 38 Journals of the Continental Congress 376, 378 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1785).
13 2 Stat. 445 (1845).
'4 Lake, Legal Profile of the Mining Industry, 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 399-415.
15 Wis. Laws 1911. c. 452.
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It is possible for private individuals to receive grants to prospect and
mine ore on public lands, but the provision reserving mineral owner-
ship to the state remains a part of the state's law.
Policy such as that represented by the Wisconsin statute has been
the exception rather than the rule, and the alienation of the public
domain has, as a rule, been without the reservation of any public right.
Subsequent attempts to recover some semblance of public right in the
interest of conservation and scientific utilization of resources have been
met with a legally recognized and often very powerful private interest.
Because of the inherent limitation on the supply of any given
resource, and because of the dependence of society on the resource base,
there exists an undeniable public interest not only in the extent of
resources but in the methods of exploitation and utilization. Conser-
vation is often equated with the prevention of waste, and though this
in itself is too narrow a definition of conservation, the prevention of
waste is certainly an important aspect of conservation. Difficulties arise,
however, when groups or individuals representing different interests
and points of view attach different meanings to the concept of waste.
Fo one group, waste may be considered from the economics of produc-
tion or exploitation of the natural resource itself. From this approach
it might be concluded that the method of resource utilization which
involves the least waste is that method which accomplishes the most
rapid and most complete exploitation of the resource. Frequently such a
view has been the result of reliance, for determination of resource policy,
on the economic self interest of those who had either ownership or con-
trol of our natural resources.
Obviously, waste, when considered in terms of public or social
values, is a very different thing. Although historically the attitude of
the general American public has been one of complacency toward nat-
ural resources, there is a public concern in preservation for the future
of a share of our exhaustible resources, and the concern over any single
resource increases the nearer that resource is to exhaustion. It is very
likely that there will be conflict between the different concepts of waste
over what the future should have in the way of a balanced supply of
natural resources. It is not necessarily true that just because a given
resource is cheaper in terms of its current availability it should be used
to the exclusion of its alternatives up to the point at which costs are
equal to those of its closest substitute.
To a large extent, problems of this type arise because of the char-
acter of property ownership. It may be impossible to eliminate the
problems, but through the proper use of taxation it is possible for the
state to mitigate objectionable aspects of private property .such as the
use of property for private profit without regard to community purposes.
Our mineral resources, once consumed, are gone. They cannot be
renewed. A continuous supply of resources is necessary if the United
States is to maintain its position as a nation capable of leadership in
the modern world. Long-term planning in resource conservation will be
necessary to insure that resources will be available in sufficient quan-
tities when they are needed, but the question is, whose responsibility
is it to conserve our natural resources? Extensive national security pro-
SICHS-LLLOR- (ORPORITIOn SEALS- LPInE 5-3422
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grams have brought many new forces to bear on the economy generally
and on the resource base, and have expanded the role of the federal
government in our economic life. Even though the major portion of our
irreplaceable resource is in private hands, there has been little objection
from the owners to the increasing role which the federal government
has played in discovering new sources, developing new processes, stock-
piling, and even allocating a'atible supplies. But the demands of
national security are not the only ones which have been increasing.
There has been a general demand by the people for an increase in the
services afforded by government at all levels, and all the agencies of
government have had to increase their functions accordingly.
All these factors mean an additional load on the resource base,
with the result that we are constantly increasing the rate at which our
irreplaceable supply of natural resources is being used up. This increased
rate of resource exploitation represents quite a different problem for a
state than it does for the nation as a whole. Considered at the national
level, the exhaustion of a given resource may be of little significance if
an adequate substitute is available at an equivalent cost. For example,
exhaustion of our petroleum resources might not be important in terms
of overall resource availability if products from either shale or coal
could be produced in large enough quantities to meet the nation's needs
without an appreciable difference in costs. Similarly, the technological
obsolescence of a given resource may be an outgrowth of developments
which will bring about a higher quality product or a more efficient
operation and consequently an increase in total national output. A pos-
sible example of this is at issue in the question currently being raised
as to whether thorium or hydrogen may replace uranium as a nuclear
fuel.
Although either of these situatons, in terms of national aggregates,
might represent no worsening of our resource position, it could hardly
be said that a state which has large petroleum reserves now, and no
significant deposits of coal or shale, or a state with a major industry
currently engaged in the production of uranium would be unaffected.
The state as such has more than a casual interest in the value of mineral
deposits within its borders and in the activities which affect the ability
of the resource base to contribute to the well-being of the citizens of that
state. It is the responsibility of the appropriate policy making agencies
within any state to make sure that the wealth represented by its natural
resources contributes sufficiently to the support of state functions. It is a
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further responsibility incumbent on state officials to insure sufficient
continuity in resource development so that the legitimate claims of
future generations to their share of the state's natural wealth can be met.
The resources of a state are an important part of the tax base of
the state and must be considered as such. An equitable apportioning
of the tax burden which is necessary to support state functions may
require a different form of taxation for resources which are non-renew-
able from that which applies to renewable resources. The state and its
citizens incur a loss to the extent that non-renewable resources within
the state are consumed. This loss can only be compensated for by requir-
ing a contribution to the state from the benefits yielded by private
resource exploitation which is in reasonable proportion to the depletion
of the state's source of wealth.
In the taxation of mineral resources, the various states have gen-
erally followed one or the other of two principal methods, (1) the
property (al valorem) tax, (2) the severance (output) tax. The prop-
erty tax has been in more widespread use over a long period of time,
but there has been a definite trend toward increased use of the severance
tax in recent years.
Most states have applied the general property or ad valorem tax
to all property on the same basis, with no special distinction made con-
cerning mineral deposits. A few states, Colorado 16 among them, have not
applied the property tax to metal mines on a true ad valorem basis, but
instead have used net revenue, gross revenue or some multiple thereof
as the assessment base. The reason most frequently advanced in support
of the property tax is that it provides equity and uniformity in taxation.
This assumes that market value can be used as a common denominator
for all wealth, be it agricultural, industrial, commercial, or mineral,
regardless of whether it is in the form of land, buildings, personal prop-
erty, or underground deposits. A further assumption implicit in the
argument favoring uniform application of the property tax is that
society has no greater interest in the use to which any certain type of
property is put or the way in which it is used than it has in any other.
Such an assumption is quite unrealistic when a distinction is made
between renewable and non-renewable resources or property. State au-
thorities are gradually recognizing that various kinds of property may
represent different tax paying abilities, and consequently that all prop-
erty need not be assessed uniformly or even taxed in the same manner.
There is an additional problem related to the application of a
property tax to mineral deposits. The very nature of mineral deposits
makes satisfactory appraisal or valuation extremely difficult if not
impossible. The fact that mineral deposits and mines do not have a
readily acsertainable market value, since sales of such properties are
infrequent, means that assessors must use some other criteria for making
appraisals. This usually requires far more technical training, if it is to be
done accurately, than the average assessor can be depended on to have.
The value of non-renewable resources will depend on a variety of fac-
tors including the future cost of extraction, and the selling price of the
product. These in turn will depend on such things as technological
development in extraction and production methods, possible product
16 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 137-5-4 (1953).
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usages, the extent of the market, and the rate of exhaustion. The almost
invariable result in this situation has been an under evaluation of the
property involved, with changes in assessed value lagging considerably
behind changes in current market value. To the extent that the assessed
value is below actual value, the property in question does not bear its
share of the tax burden, and increased tax loads elsewhere will be neces-
sary to support governmental functions. Furthermore, when the taxable
property is a non-renewable resource, there is a permanent loss of a part
of the tax base.
The severance tax is a levy'placed on the production resulting from
exploitation of natural resources. The tax may be applied according
to units of output or as a percentage tax based on the value of gross
output. Both methods are similar relative to administration, revenue,
and effects on industry, and can be considered together in terms of their
advantages and disadvantages.
First of all, the severance tax has the advantage of simplicity: it is
easily collectable. It can be made to yield large amounts of revenue, the
yield of course depending on the rate applied. Furthermore the sever-
ance tax can be used to implement conservation policy. An increase in
the tax rates will tend to discourage production, while more rapid exploi-
tation to meet urgent needs can be encouraged by lower rates. This use
of the severance tax in protecting the public interest in natural resources
is in contrast to the operation of an ad valorem tax on property, which
often operates in the opposite direction from the one desired.
There is a real disadvantage to the severance tax as a revenue
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not producing. As a solution, some states have applied both a sevcrance
tax and a property tax in a complementary way, thus eliminating the
possibility that owners of resources might hold them idle in anticipa-
tion of speculative profits, paying no taxes in the meantime.
Objections have sometimes been raised to the severance tax because
the public revenue derived from it fluctuates from year to year as pro-
duction varies. This it is said works a hardship on local governments
that must depend on the revenue to support their operations. There is
validity to this objection, but there is also a definite need for balancing
the interests of local governments with the proper conservation of the
state's natural resources. A severance tax administered by the state tax
commission could provide revenue to be used as an equalization fund
for the support of local governments. The funds from such a tax could
also be held as a reserve to alleviate problems that might arise if and
when certain of the state's resources are exhausted.
Another important aspect of the tax treatment of natural resources
is the taxation of income derived from resource exploitation in the form
of a federal or state income tax. In this area the depletion allowance is
by far the most significant concept that has been developed in the tax
structure. Soon after the enactment of the federal income tax law in
1913, efforts were begun to obtain special tax treatment for the oil
industry. It was represented to Congress that prospecting for oil is done
mostly by individuals or small concerns. When the prospectors or wild-
catters struck oil, they sold out and moved on to new and undeveloped
territory. Indications were that sometimes for years a wildcatter had no
income from which to deduct losses, and that when he did find oil, the
tax rate was so high that it prevented him from even recouping losses
from former years.'"
Representatives of the oil industry further represented that under
the pressures of the (first) World War, the United States was consum-
ing 60,000 barrels of oil a day more than it was producing. On the basis
of these conditions, Congress included in the 1918 revenue act'8 an emer-
genecy measure providing for a depletion allowance for certain minerals.
As the law was passed, however, discovery value was not an allowable
deduction from the profits arising out of the sale of an oil well or mine,
but it was deductible only from the income arising out of the operation
of the well or mine. It appears from this that the very ones for whose
17 S. Rep. No. 27, 69th Cong.. 1st Sess. 21 (1926).
18 40 Stat. 1078 (1918).-
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relief the exemption was supposedly provided-the wildcatters-were
allowed no benefit from it.
As early as 1925 a congressional investigative committee found that
the situation intended to be met by the depletion allowance provision
had changed to such an extent that every reason advanced for its enact-
ment had disappeared. It was pointed out that except in the case of
mines and oil and gas wells, no investor was permitted to set up the
value of his business, after its success had been demonstrated, as a deduc-
tion from the profit derived from that business for the purpose of
determining net income.19
In apparent oblivion to the findings and recommendations of its
own committee, Congress, in the 1926 revenue act, 20 not only continued,
but expanded the provisions for depletion allowances. For mines the
allowance remained virtually the same-a deduction not to exceed 50
per cent of net income, and applicable only to mines discovered after
1913. The provision for depletion of oil and gas wells represented a
significant departure from the earlier law. In the case of oil and gas
wells, the allowance for depletion was set at 271/2 per cent of gross
income from the property, but not to exceed 50 per cent of net income.
This allowance was not related in any way whatsoever to exploration or
discovery, nor was it made contingent upon any other condition. It was
purely and simply a tax deduction equal to 27/2 per cent of gross income
which Congress saw fit to grant to the oil and gas industry. Neither
justification nor explanation was offered.
Since 1926, the depletion allowance has remained a part of the
federal tax structure; naturally so lucrative a privilege could not go
unnoticed by other industries. Pressures have been brought to bear,
and gradually Congress has extended the privilege of tax exemption to
other mineral industries. In 195021 gross income from mineral property
was redefined so as to include value added as a result of transportation
costs between points of extraction and plants or mills. In 195122 the list
of minerals covered was expanded and percentages were generally re-
vised upward. The 1954 internal revenue code23 brought another general
expansion of the number of minerals covered, and again raised the per-
centages. While oil and gas have remained at 27 percent, most metals
and ores are now given a 23 per cent deduction, and with a few excep-
tions all other minerals are allowed 15 per cent. The only minerals not
included are those from sea water or air or other sources generally
regarded as inexhaustible.
It has not been uncommon for the states to incorporate schedules
for percentage depletion allowance into their tax structures. In most
instances, justification at the state level has been by reference to the
existence of the federal system, with little or no question raised as to
the necessity of such allowances or the purposes they might serve. The
percentage granted to each mineral often varies from state to state,
reflecting to some extent the importance of different industries in each
state's economy. Colorado, as an example. allows 10 per cent for coal
19 S. Rep. No. 27, 69th Cong. 1st Sess. 18 (1926).
2044 Stat. 16 (1926).
21 64 Stat. 931 (1950).
22 65 Stat. 497 (1951).
2_ Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 611.
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mines, 27 per cent for oil and gas wells, and 40 per cent for metal and
other mines.
24
It is unfortunate that the states have been so willing to adopt the
use of the depletion allowance, for there is reason to believe that the tax
immunity it affords depletes the public revenue, creates social injustice,
and produces distortions in the economy to an extent that far outweighs
any benefits it might offer. The loss of potential revenue which the
depletion allowance imposes on the federal treasury alone have been
estimated to be as high as $1 billion per year. 25 Less information is avail-
able in terms of state revenue, but there can be no doubt that the losses
are considerable.
The original purpose of the depletion allowance was to stimulate
exploration, but why, it can be asked, are not private profit incentives
and a free price system sufficient to insure adequate supplies. If assist-
ance to the mineral industries is necessary to meet emergency needs,
a more selective method with performance requirements would serve
the public interest better than such a generalized privilege of tax im-
munity. If the risks are greater in the mineral industries than in busi-
ness enterprise generally even after all the modern scientific methods
and the institutional devices for spreading risks are considered, a higher
return to capital, as determined in a free market should be sufficient to
compensate for them. It is unwise to use special privilege to divert eco-
nomic resources into extractive industries, while failing to maintain
controls which would make it possible to protect and expand the natural
resource base on which the whole economy depends.
24 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 138-1-23 (1953).
25 Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Federal Tax Policy for Economic
Growth and Stability, Joint Committee Print, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 413 (1955).
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Action Against State-Liability and Consent of State to Suit-
Consent Not Prerequisite in Colorado
By PAULINE NELSON
Pauline Nelson is a graduate of the University of Colorado, a student at the
University of Denver College of Law, and a member of the staff of DICTA.
Plaintiff and other Colorado race track associations brought an
action against the Racing Commission and the State Treasurer for a
declaratory judgment to determine, first, whether under the state pari-
mutuel racing act the "breakage"' belonged to the tracks or to the State,
and, secondly, whether plaintiffs were entitled to receive back from the
State Treasurer the "breakage" paid to the State under protest. By
stipulation of the parties the trial court's decision was limited to the
first question only, and decision of the second was deferred. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court reversed a judgment adverse to plaintiffs, and held
the "breakage" should be retained by the tracks.' Plaintiff thereupon
applied to the trial court for determination of its second prayer; and,
after hearing, the court entered judgment in plaintiff's favor for $22,000.
Defendants sought a reversal on the ground the suit was one against
the State in its sovereign capacity; that the State could not be sued with-
out its consent; that the State had not consented to the suit, either by
its participation in the original trial or otherwise; and that there was
no fund from which the judgment could be paid. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment in an opinion which describes the doctrine of
sovereign immunity as "archaic" and "outmoded." The Court held a
citizen is entitled to a judicial determination of his rights, whether they
collide with an individual or with the sovereign state. Colorado Racing
Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 316 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1957).
In a case decided two months earlier, the Court, while it did not
expressly abrogate the rule of state immunity, accomplished the same
result in a contract action by adopting a theory of implied waiver. In
that case, defendant, the Colorado Department of Agriculture, awarded
to plaintiff a contract for spraying grasshopper-infested range land.
Plaintiff's bid of thirteen cents per acre was made with the understand-
ing that a million and a half acres were to be sprayed, and the written
contract so provided. Plaintiff was permitted to spray only 240,000
acres and was paid for that amount at the contract rate. He then
brought suit for damages for breach of contract. A motion to dismiss
was granted, on the ground the State had not consented to the suit.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a state agency enters
into an authorized contract it thereby waives the State's immunity from
suit. Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 314 P.2d 278
(Colo. 1957).
In a concurring opinion in the Ace Flying Service case, Justice
Moore contended the doctrine of sovereign immunity was contrary to
the constitutional guaranty of due process, in that it denied to a plaintiff
his "'day in court" whenever his opponent was the State. The majority
1 "Breakage" is the amount of odd pennies !eft over after computing winning
wagers to the nearest dime.
2 Centennial Turf Club v. Racing Comm'n, 129 Colo. 529, 271 P.2d 1046 (1954).
314 P.2d at 282.
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of the Court, however, followed the usual practice in such cases and
declined to determine the constitutional question when the case could
be decided on another ground. In the Racing Commission case the "im-
plied waiver" theory could not be applied, and the Court then squarely
faced the constitutional issue and declared the courts are open to
decide the rights of citizens, and a remedy will not be denied solely
because the adversary is the State.
Thus, while courts of other jurisdictions have adhered strictly to
the doctrine of immunity,4 and have left it to the legislatures to relax
its application by statute, Colorado has become a pioneer in abandoning,
by judicial action, the rule that the state may not be sued without its
consent.
The rule of sovereign immunity is one of the oldest known to the
common law, beginning with the theory that the king was above the
law and could do no wrong. It is also one of the most firmly entrenched,
finding its later justification in the idea that it is against public policy
to allow the state's treasury, belonging to all the people, to be depleted
at the suit of a few.
The history of the rule in Colorado began in 1895 with the so-
called "Benedictine Sisters Case,"5 an advisory opinion given by the
Supreme Court to the House of Representatives. The House had before
it a bill already passed by the Senate, providing for compensation to the
Sisters for damage to their building, caused by the State's construction
of a canal. The House asked the Court, first, whether the State was
liable; and, secondly, if the State was liable, whether it was within the
province of the Legislature to determine and pay the damages. The
Court advised that the injury was in effect a taking of private property
for public use, and the State was constitutionally liable for just com-
pensation;6 but that since the State was immune from suit the liability
could not be enforced in the courts, and the Legislature was the proper
body to determine the damages and provide for payment.
The question was presented to the Court in an actual controversy
forty years later, when a telegraph company sued for "just compensa-
4 For collection of cases see Annots., 25 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952); 42 A.L.R. 1464 (1926).
5 In re Constitutionality of Substitute for Sen. Bill 83, 21 Colo. 69, 39 Pac. 1088
(1895).
6 Colo. Const. art. II § 15 (1876).
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tion" for damages caused in removing its pole lines to make way for
construction of a state hospital building. The Court held that although
the State might be liable the courts could not entertain the suit in the
absence of the State's consent, and plaintiff's only recourse was to the
Legislature.
7
Until 1952 the Colorado court applied the doctrine of sovereign
immunity without limitation in any action which wag clearly against
the State in its sovereign capacity. At the same time, in Colorado as in
other jurisdictions, there developed a distinction between suits against
the State as sovereign and suits against the State as proprietor. The
State could be sued regardless of its consent in any case involving its
"purely business" functions, for example the leasing of state lands.'
Further, there was established the principle that a suit against a
state officer or agency is not necessarily a suit against the state. If an
officer, acting unlawfully and in excess of his authority, invades private
rights, he may be sued for redress. Since his acts are not authorized or
sanctioned by the state, he cannot escape liability by invoking the
state's immunity.9
It is not easy to define the line where a suit nominally against a
state agency ceases to be a suit against the sovereign. Courts have gen-
erally stated the test in terms of "controlling" state action-a suit against
the state is one in which a judgment for the plaintiff could operate to
compel performance of an obligation which belongs to the state in its
political capacity, or subject it to a liability for payment of funds out
of the state treasury. If a plaintiff is seeking governmental action which
the state would not otherwise take, or the payment of money which
would not otherwise be paid, the suit is one against the state in its
sovereign capacity and cannot be maintained in the absence of the
state's consent.' 0
From this distinction the Colorado court took the logical next step
and in the Boxberger and Dawson cases," decided in 1952, adopted fur-
ther limitations on the immunity rule. The Boxberger case was a suit
for cancellation of a deed. It did not involve illegal action by the state
agency, but was grounded on mutual mistake. The court pointed out
the action was not one in tort, not one to impose liability on the state
or to recover money from the state treasury, but merely an action to
restore the status quo. In such a case, the court held, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity must give way to the constitutional rights of the
citizen.
The Dawson decision was the forerunner of the Ace Flying Service
7 State v. Colorado Postal Telegraph Co., 104 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939). See
also Mitchell v. Board of County Commissioners, 112 Colo. 582, 152 P.2d 601 (1944);
Parry v. State Board of Corrections, 93 Colo. 589, 28 P.2d 251 (1933).
s State Board of Land Commissioners v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. App. 436 (1901). See
also Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 927 (1955).
9 Alfred v. Esser, 91 Colo. 466, 15 P.2d 714 (1932).
0Annot., 160 A.L.R. 332 (1946).
11 Boxberger v. State Highway Dept.. 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); State
Highway Dept. v. Dawson, 126 Colo. 490, 253 P.2d 593 (1952).
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case, holding that the State's authorized contracts are enforceable to
the same extent as those of an individual. Plaintiff Dawson had fur-
nished gravel to the State Highway Department, which refused payment
in the belief that plaintiff was not the owner. In overruling the State's
defense of sovereign immunity the court emphasized that funds had
been appropriated and "earmarked" for the project in question, and a
judgment would result in no additional financial burdens on the state.
Said the court, "Here no further liability would accrue other than that
anticipated and for which provision is made.1
12
It should be noted that in none of the Colorado cases was there
any attempt to establish the State's liability in tort. Actions not based
on contract were brought on an "eminent domain" theory, i.e., for com-
pensation for property taken for public use. This was done to escape
the rule against tort liability, established in actions against counties.
Counties in Colorado are by statute subject to suit, 3 but it has been
held consistently that the county, as a branch of government, is not
liable for the torts of its agents. 4 Thus, even in the Racing Commission
case, the court has not touched the State's immunity in tort actions,
where the rule is not merely that the State is not suable, but that the
State is not liable.
The Racing Commission case might have been decided without
upsetting the immunity rule, by a holding that the action was not against
the State but against the State Treasurer for money unlawfully col-
lected. Since the State interposed the defense, however, the Court
decided the question directly, by holding not that the immunity rule
was inapplicable but that there was no immunity. In doing so the Court
has carried to its ultimate conclusion the trend set in motion by the
Boxberger and Dawson cases.
The effect of the Dawson case was that the State might be sued
in any case where the plaintiff's claim might be paid from an appropri-
ation already made. The same implication is present in the Ace Flying
Service case. This holding was the source of the State's defense in the
Racing Commission case that there was no fund from which the judg-
ment could be paid. Behind this contention is a recognition of the
constitutional requirement that no funds may be paid from the state
12 126 Colo. at 493, 253 P.2d at 594.
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1-1 (1953).
14 Richardson v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 Pae. 119 (1923); Board of Commissioners
V. Ball, 22 Colo. 125, 43 Pac. 1000 (1896); Board of Commissioners v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474,
33 Pac. 184 (1893). Cf. Board of Commissioners v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621 (1920);
Board of ConimFsioners v. Colorado Spr~ngs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301 (1919).
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treasury except upon appropriation lawfully made by the legislature.15
It is also acknowledged that a judgment against the state cannot be
collected by execution; 16 in any action against a state the court's authority
ends with the judgment. Thus the State's argument was in effect that
since the courts could go no further they should not go so far-that since
the State's consent might be required to collect the judgment there was
no room to relax the requirement of consent to bring the suit.
In rejecting this contention the court has accomplished a complete
reversal of the advice given in the Benedictine Sisters case. The court
in 1895 declared it was the duty of the legislature, and the legislature
only, to determine the State's liability to a suitor who claims he has been
injured by the State. The 1957 court has placed that duty in the courts,
where it more properly belongs. It may be true that the suitor must
still go to the legislature for payment of whatever may be due him,
but he goes with a claim supported by a court's determination of validity.
The court cannot compel action by the legislature. Control of the
treasury is a legislative power with which the courts cannot interfere.
But the procedure now evolved by the court is a reasonable one, placing
responsibility for initial determination of the claim in the courts.
15 Colo. Const. art. V § 33 (1876).
16 81 C.J.S. 1343, States § 232 (1953).
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